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We give a logical framework for reasoning with observations at different time points.
We call belief extrapolation the process of completing initial belief sets stemming
from observations by assuming minimal change. We give a general semantics and we
propose several extrapolation operators. We study some key properties veriﬁed by these
operators and we address computational issues. We study in detail the position of belief
extrapolation with respect to revision and update: in particular, belief extrapolation is
shown to be a speciﬁc form of time-stamped belief revision. Several related lines of work
are positioned with respect to belief extrapolation.
© 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Reasoning about change is a major issue in knowledge representation. Several belief change paradigms have been deeply
investigated: belief revision is usually viewed as changing an agent’s initial belief state to take into account a new piece of
information referring to the same situation; more generally, belief merging consists in integrating several belief states about
the same situation into a single belief state; belief update modiﬁes a belief state according to a possible change in the world
corresponding to an action effect expressed by a propositional formula. A closely related area of research is reasoning about
action, where progression (consisting in determining the belief state obtained after an action is performed, given the initial
belief state and the description of the effects of the action) and conversely regression, can be considered as well as classes
of belief change operators.
A belief change paradigm that has been considered much less often is the following: given a series of observations
obtained at different time points, ﬁnd out the most plausible events that occurred (and when they occurred). Here we
give to this class of problems a deep attention, assuming minimal change (or equivalently, assuming that the world has a
tendency towards inertia). We call this belief change paradigm belief extrapolation, because it amounts to complete initial
beliefs at different time points using some assumptions about how the world evolves.1
Since belief extrapolation deals with beliefs at different time points, it is worth saying now why it differs from belief
update (this will be made more precise in Section 7). Let us discuss it ﬁrst in the speciﬁc case where there are only two time
✩ A preliminary version of this article appeared in the Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
(KR2002). This submission includes signiﬁcant revisions and expansions.
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1 Since we are interested in such a completion not only on future time points, but more generally on any time point in the history of observations, belief
interpolation could have been a better name. However, since the conference version of this article [13] makes use of the name extrapolation, which has been
reused later by several authors, we prefer to minimize change and ambiguity, and keep this name.0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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2), and belief update also has as input two formulae attached to time points 1 and 2. However, the formula corresponding
to 2 has a very different interpretation in update and extrapolation.
• extrapolation: some time has passed between the initial time point 1 when the initial belief state K was known to hold
and a later time point 2 when ϕ is observed (by means of a sensor, a request to a database, a notiﬁcation by another
agent, etc.);
• update: ϕ is the expected consequence of an action or an event that occurred between 1 and 2.
Failing to distinguish these types of information may lead to counterintuitive results, as seen on the following example:
Example 1. We consider a system to diagnose, whose components may fail independently (there is no prior causal link
between the failure of a component and the failure of another one). The system has a tendency towards inertia: by default,
the mode of a given component – working or faulty) persists (in other words, changes of mode are exceptional).
Scenario 1: at t = 1, we know that exactly one of components a and b is faulty, and c works correctly: K = (ok_a ⊕
ok_b) ∧ ok_c where ⊕ denotes exclusive or. After waiting for some time, at t = 2, some new observations (coming for
instance from tests) make us learn that component b is ok but c is not: ϕ = ok_b ∧¬ok_c.
Scenario 2: at t = 1, like in Scenario 1, K = (ok_a⊕ok_b)∧ok_c. Then the action of replacing b by a brand new component
as well as the (unfortunate) action of breaking down component c are performed. The effects of these two independent
actions can be expressed by ϕ = ok_b ∧¬ok_c.
These two scenarios are different and lead to different plausible conclusions about the evolution of the world. In Scenario
1, since component b is OK and changes are exceptional, there are good reasons to believe that b was already OK at time
1, so component a was the faulty one and most expectedly still is; there is no ambiguity about c, which has just been
observed faulty. Therefore, the belief state at time 2 should be ¬ok_a ∧ ok_b ∧ ¬ok_c. In Scenario 2, the effect of replacing
b does not bring any new information on its former state, nor, a fortiori, on the former state of a; the belief about a should
thus remain unchanged and the belief state at t = 2 should be ok_b ∧¬ok_c.
Belief update may be the right thing to do for Scenario 2, but not for Scenario 1. This inadequacy of belief update to
handle Scenario 1 is due to the most “typical” property of belief update, namely U8 (see Section 7) which says that models
of K should be updated independently; as a consequence, usual belief update operators satisfy K  ϕ = ok_b ∧ ¬ok_c; this
is the expected result for Scenario 2 but not for Scenario 1, where we expect ¬ok_a∧ ok_b ∧¬ok_c.
Scenario 2 suggests that belief update works when the input is the expected result (or projection) of an action (or an event)
whose occurrence is known to the agent. Now, how should we change a belief base to take account of observations occurring at
different time points, as in Scenario 1? This question leads to deﬁning a different operator that we call belief extrapolation.
This operator takes a sequence of observations assumed to hold for certain and projects these observations forwards and
backwards, assuming that ﬂuents tend to persist throughout time. The basic assumptions for extrapolation operators are the
following:
1. the agent observes some properties of the world at different time points, but does not have the ability of performing actions;
furthermore, if exogenous events occur, they are perceived by the agent through the observations of their effects only
(for instance, the occurrence of the event that it rained last night is perceived by actually having seen the rain last night,
or by seeing the wet ground this morning). This is why changes can be qualiﬁed as unpredicted.
2. the system is inertial: by default, it remains in a static state. This assumption justiﬁes the use of a change minimization
policy.
Our main contribution is a thorough investigation of this extrapolation process. Although such processes had been con-
sidered in the past (see Section 8), they had never received such a deep attention nor such a systematic study in a belief
change perspective. Our contributions are both foundational and computational. On the foundational side, we deﬁne a very
general and structured class of extrapolation operators. We establish a very precise connection between extrapolation and
belief revision, showing that extrapolation can be seen as a particular case of revision over a time-stamped language (Propo-
sition 3). This leads us to give an axiomatic framework for extrapolation: Propositions 4 and 5 are representation theorems
inherited from representation theorems for belief revision, whereas Propositions 6, 8 and Lemma 3 give suﬃcient (and
sometimes necessary) conditions for some speciﬁc temporal properties (reversibility, Markovianity, independence of empty
observations) to be satisﬁed. We also give an impossibility result (Proposition 16) showing that an extrapolation operator
cannot be an update operator. On the computational side, we identify the computational complexity of belief extrapola-
tion (Proposition 12). Then we give a method for computing extrapolated beliefs, for a speciﬁc (yet representative enough)
operator (Proposition 15).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give the formal deﬁnition of belief extrapolation. In Sec-
tion 3 we propose and discuss several classes of extrapolation operators. In Section 4 we show that belief extrapolation
can be seen as a particular belief revision process, where the beliefs about the persistence of ﬂuents are revised by time-
stamped observations. In Section 5 we show that extrapolation, however, goes beyond revision, since it enjoys some speciﬁc
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olated beliefs for one of the simplest extrapolation operators considered in Section 3. In Section 7, we study the connections
between extrapolation and update; we show that a belief extrapolation operator cannot be a belief update operator unless
very strong assumptions are made. Connections with several other works are investigated in Section 8, especially dynamic
diagnosis, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. Belief extrapolation: deﬁnitions and general properties
2.1. Temporal formulae, scenarios and trajectories
Let L be a propositional language built from a ﬁnite set of propositional variables (or ﬂuents) V , the usual connectives,
and the Boolean constants  (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction). M = 2V is the set of interpretations, or states, for V .
Formulae of L are denoted by small Greek letters (ϕ , ψ etc.) and interpretations are denoted by m, m′ etc.
An interpretation m is usually denoted by listing the literals it satisﬁes; for instance, a¬b¬c denotes the interpreta-
tion assigning a to true and b and c to false. If ϕ ∈ L then Mod(ϕ) is the set of all models of ϕ . |
 denotes classical
logical consequence. If X ⊆ M then form(X) is the propositional formula, unique up to logical equivalence, such that
Mod(form(X)) = X .
A literal is a variable or its negation; if l = v (resp. ¬v) then ¬l is ¬v (resp. v). The set of literals associated with V
is LIT = {v,¬v | v ∈V }. A formula ϕ is said to be complete if it has only one model, or equivalently, if it is equivalent to a
maximal consistent conjunction of literals.
Deﬁnition 1 (Temporal formulae). Let N be a positive integer (representing the number of time points considered). A time-
stamped propositional variable is a propositional variable indexed by a time point. If v ∈V and t ∈ 1,N then the intuitive
meaning of v(t) is that v(t) holds if and only if v holds at time t . V(N) = {v(t) | v ∈V ,1 t  N} denotes the set of all time-
stamped propositional variables (with respect to V and N). L(N) is the language generated from V(N) , the time-stamped
Boolean constants (t) and ⊥(t) (1 t  N) and the usual connectives.
A formula of L(N) is called a temporal formula. Temporal formulae are denoted by capital Greek letters (Φ , Ψ etc.) For
any formula ϕ of L and any time point t ∈ 1,N, ϕ(t) denotes the temporal formula obtained by time-stamping each
variable v appearing in ϕ by t , i.e., replacing v by v(t) . ϕ(t) is called a t-formula.
For instance, ((a∧¬b) ∨ c)(1) = (a(1) ∧¬b(1)) ∨ c(1) .
Deﬁnition 2 (Scenarios). A scenario is a conjunction of t-formulae for t ∈ 1,N, i.e., a temporal formula Σ of the form
ϕ1(1) ∧ · · · ∧ ϕN(N) , where ϕ1, . . . , ϕN are formulae of L . To simplify notations, a scenario Σ is written as a ﬁnite sequence
of propositional formulae: Σ = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN 〉, where Σ(i) = ϕ i . S(N) denotes the set of all scenarios.2
The intuitive motivation for introducing scenarios is that in practice, temporal formulae may often result from a series
of observations at different (but precisely located) time points. However, considering scenarios only is not suﬃcient since it
does not allow for expressing dependencies between ﬂuents at different time points, neither observations whose temporal
location is imprecise.
Example 2. Let V = {a,b} and N = 3. a(1)∧(a(2)∨¬b(2))∧(3) is a scenario, which we denote more simply by 〈a,a∨¬b,〉.
a(1) ∨ b(2) is a temporal formula (but not a scenario).
Deﬁnition 3 (Trajectories). TRAJ(N) = 2V(N) denotes the set of all interpretations for V(N) , called temporal interpretations, or
trajectories. For the sake of notation, a trajectory τ will be denoted as a sequence τ = 〈τ (1), . . . , τ (N)〉 of interpretations
in M . Since a trajectory τ is nothing but an interpretation for the vocabulary V(N) , and a temporal formula is based on
the same vocabulary, the satisfaction of a temporal formula Φ ∈ L(N) by a trajectory τ ∈ TRAJ(N) is deﬁned in the usual
way (as in standard propositional logic) and is denoted by τ |
 Φ . Traj(Φ) = {τ ∈ TRAJ(N)|τ |
 Φ} is the set of trajectories
satisfying Φ . A temporal formula Φ is consistent if and only if Traj(Φ) = ∅.
A trajectory τ is static if and only if τ (1) = · · · = τ (N).
If τ is a trajectory and v ∈ V , we denote by τ (t)(v) the truth value of v at time t in τ , that is, τ (t)(v) = true if τ (t) |
 v
and τ (t)(v) = false if τ (t) |
 ¬v .
Note that if Σ is a scenario, then τ |
 Σ if and only if ∀t ∈ 1,N we have τ (t) |
 Σ(t). Moreover, a scenario Σ is
consistent if and only if for each i ∈ 1,N, Σ(i) is consistent.
2 Formally, we should write SV ,N , since the set of scenarios has been deﬁned for a given set of propositional variables V and a ﬁxed N . However, for
the sake of notation we prefer to omit the subscripts whenever this does not induce any ambiguity.
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Fig. 2. Trajectories satisfying Φ = (a(1) ↔ a(2)) ∧ b(1) ∧¬b(2) and S(Φ).
Example 3. Let us consider the scenario Σ = 〈a,a∨ c,b,¬a∨¬b,¬c〉. The trajectories satisfying Σ are all those connecting
the big dots of Fig. 1. Two of them are represented: τ 0 = 〈m3,m7,m5,m5,m8〉 and τ 1 = 〈m2,m2,m2,m4,m4〉.
A temporal formula is not necessarily expressible by a scenario. However, it is possible to deﬁne a scenario which is a
conjunctive approximation of a temporal formula. This scenario is obtained by projecting the formula at each time point:
Deﬁnition 4 (Scenario approximation of a temporal formula). Given a temporal formula Ψ ∈ L(N) , its scenario approxima-
tion is the scenario S(Ψ ) = 〈Ψ ↓1, . . . ,Ψ ↓N 〉, where Ψ ↓t is the formula of L , unique up to logical equivalence such that
Mod(Ψ ↓t) = {τ (t) | τ ∈ Traj(Ψ )}.
Note that the projection Ψ ↓t is the result of forgetting all variables except those concerning time t in Ψ (Ψ ↓t =
Forget({v(t′)|v(t′) ∈ V(N) and t′ = t}, Ψ )) where forgetting a set of variables F in a propositional formula ϕ is deﬁned
inductively as follows [24]:
Forget
({x},ϕ)= ϕx←⊥ ∨ ϕx←,
Forget
({x} ∪ F ,ϕ)= Forget({x}, Forget(F ,ϕ)).
Note also that Ψ ↓t is the strongest formula (unique up to logical equivalence) implied by Ψ in which only variables of V(t)
appear (see [21]).
Intuitively, S(Ψ ) is obtained from Ψ by forgetting the dependencies between the pieces of information pertaining to different
time points; equivalently, S(Ψ ) is the strongest temporal formula such that (a) Ψ |
 S(Ψ ) and (b) for every t ∈ 1,N and
every formula ϕ ∈L , Ψ |
 ϕ(t) if and only if S(Ψ ) |
 ϕ(t) .
Note that the trajectories satisfying S(Ψ ) are obtained by “crossing” the trajectories in Traj(Ψ ). If τ 1, . . . , τ N are N
trajectories, let τ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τ N be the trajectory τ deﬁned by: ∀t ∈ 1,N, τ (t) = τ t(t), i.e., τ (1) = τ 1(1), . . . , τ (N) = τ N (N).
We have the following fact (whose proof is a straightforward rewriting of the deﬁnition of a scenario approximation):
Observation 1. τ ∈ Traj(S(Ψ )) if and only if there exist N trajectories τ 1, . . . , τ N in Traj(Ψ ) such that τ = τ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τ N .
Observation 2. S is monotonic with respect to logical consequence.
Proof. Let us consider two formulae Ψ,Ψ ′ ∈L(N) such that Ψ |
 Ψ ′ . Let us show that S(Ψ ) |
 S(Ψ ′). Let τ ∈ TRAJN such
that τ |
 S(Ψ ). From Observation 1, we get that ∃τ 1, . . . , τ N in Traj(Ψ ) such that τ = τ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τ N . Because Ψ |
 Ψ ′ , it
holds that τ 1, . . . , τ N belong to Traj(Ψ ′). Hence, using again Observation 1, τ |
 S(Ψ ′). 
Example 4. Let N = 2, V = {a,b} and consider the temporal formula Φ = (a(1) ↔ a(2)) ∧ b(1) ∧ ¬b(2) . Φ is satisﬁed by
two trajectories: τ = 〈ab,a¬b〉 and τ ′ = 〈¬ab,¬a¬b〉, as shown in Fig. 2. The scenario approximation of Φ is the scenario
S(Φ) = 〈b,¬b〉. S(Φ) is (obviously) satisﬁed by τ and τ ′ , but also by two more trajectories: τ ⊗ τ ′ = 〈ab,¬a¬b〉, and
τ ′ ⊗ τ = 〈¬ab,a¬b〉. What has been lost when approximating Φ into S(Φ) is the dependency between a(1) and a(2) .
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and a time point such that the literal becomes true at this time point:
Deﬁnition 5 (Change set). The change set Ch(τ ) of a trajectory τ is deﬁned by:
Ch(τ ) = {〈l, t〉 ∣∣ l ∈ LIT, t ∈ 2,N, τ (t − 1) |
 ¬l and τ (t) |
 l}.
We also use the following notions, given a change set γ :
• γ (t) = {l | 〈l, t〉 ∈ γ } is the set of literals changing to true at time point t in the change set γ
• ChTime(γ ) = {t | γ (t) = ∅} is the set of time points where at least one change occurs in γ .
• γ (l) = {t | 〈l, t〉 ∈ γ } is the set of time points where l becomes true in γ .
• ChLit(γ ) = {l ∈ LIT | γ (l) = ∅} is the set of literals that change to true at least once in γ .
Example 3 (Continued).
Ch
(
τ 0
)= {〈¬a,2〉, 〈b,3〉, 〈¬b,5〉, 〈¬c,5〉} and Ch(τ 1)= {〈¬b,4〉};
Ch
(
τ 0
)
(5) = {¬b,¬c}; ChTime(Ch(τ 0))= {2,3,5};
Ch
(
τ 0
)
(¬b) = {5}; ChLit(Ch(τ 0))= {¬a,b,¬b,¬c}.
Note that a trajectory τ can be unambiguously deﬁned by one of its states (for instance, its initial state τ (1)) and its
change set.
2.2. Preferred trajectories and extrapolation operators
Given an observation scenario Σ , or more generally a temporal formula Φ , belief extrapolation consists in completing
it by using persistence assumptions. Such a process is a speciﬁc case of chronicle completion [27]. The rationale of belief
extrapolation is that as long as nothing tells the contrary, ﬂuents do not change. Semantically, extrapolation consists in
ﬁnding the preferred trajectories satisfying Φ , with respect to some given preference relation between trajectories (this
is similar to many approaches to non-monotonic reasoning, where we select preferred models among those that satisfy a
formula).
Deﬁnition 6 (Preference relations on trajectories). A preference relation  is a reﬂexive and transitive relation on TRAJ(N) (not
necessarily connected). τ  τ ′ means that τ is at least as preferred3 as τ ′ . As usual, we write τ ≺ τ ′ (τ is strictly preferred
to τ ′) for (τ  τ ′ and not τ ′  τ ), and τ ∼ τ ′ for (τ  τ ′ and τ ′  τ ).
For any X ⊆ TRAJ(N) , a trajectory τ ∈ X is minimal w.r.t.  in X if and only if there is no τ ′ in X such that τ ′ ≺ τ . The
set of all minimal trajectories w.r.t.  in X is denoted by min(, X).
Deﬁnition 7 (Inertial and change-based preference relations). Let  be a preference relation on TRAJ(N) .
•  is inertial if for any two trajectories τ , τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N):
(i) if τ and τ ′ are both static then τ ∼ τ ′;
(ii) if τ is static and τ ′ is not then τ ≺ τ ′ .
•  is change-based if there exists a reﬂexive and transitive relation  on 2LIT×2,N such that for any two trajectories τ ,
τ ′ we have τ  τ ′ if and only if Ch(τ )  Ch(τ ′).
•  is change-monotonic if it is change-based, and if for any τ , τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) , Ch(τ ) ⊆ Ch(τ ′) implies τ  τ ′;  is strictly
change-monotonic if it is change-monotonic and for any τ , τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) , Ch(τ ) ⊂ Ch(τ ′) implies τ ≺ τ ′ .
Observation 3.
(O1)  is change-based iff for any τ , τ ′ , Ch(τ ) = Ch(τ ′) implies τ ∼ τ ′ .
(O2) Any strictly change-monotonic preference relation is inertial.
Proof.
O1: We ﬁrst show that O1 holds. From left to right, this is straightforward. From right to left: assume that for any τ , τ ′ ,
Ch(τ ) = Ch(τ ′) implies τ ∼ τ ′ and deﬁne  by: for any change sets γ1, γ2, γ1  γ2 if τ1  τ2, for some τ1 and τ2 such
3 Here, preference has to be interpreted in terms of plausibility, and not in decision-theoretic terms: τ  τ ′ means that τ is at least as plausible as τ ′ .
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any τ , τ ′ , τ  τ ′ if and only if Ch(τ )  Ch(τ ′).
O2: Assume  is strictly change-monotonic. If τ and τ ′ are static then Ch(τ ) = Ch(τ ′) = ∅, hence from (O1) and the fact
that  is change-based we get τ ∼ τ ′ . Lastly, if τ is static and τ ′ is not then Ch(τ ) = ∅ and Ch(τ ′) = ∅, therefore
Ch(τ ′) ⊃ Ch(τ ) and τ ≺ τ ′ . 
In the rest of the paper, most preference relations are inertial and change-monotonic.4 We are now in position to formally
deﬁne an extrapolation operator.
Deﬁnition 8 (Extrapolation operator). Let  be an inertial preference relation on TRAJ(N) . The extrapolation operator induced
by  maps every temporal formula Φ to another temporal formula E(Φ), unique up to logical equivalence, which is
satisﬁed exactly by the preferred trajectories among those that satisfy Φ . More formally, E is a mapping from L(N) to
L(N) such that
Traj
(
E(Φ)
)=min(,Traj(Φ)).
If  is complete then E is said to be a complete extrapolation operator.
Note that we required  to be inertial. In principle, we could perfectly well deﬁne extrapolation operators based on any
preference relation, not necessarily satisfying inertia. This would amount to saying that the world is by default not static.
In this paper, however, the assumption that the world is static is important. When discussing the various properties of
belief extrapolation as well as its connections to revision and update we will sometimes mention whether or not they are
preserved if the inertia assumption is not made.
When there is no ambiguity about the preference relation , E is written E .
As said before, we give special attention to the case where the input is a scenario and we deﬁne the operator that
associates with each initial scenario an extrapolated scenario deﬁned as the scenario projection of its extrapolation. Formally:
Ex is the mapping from S(N) to S(N) deﬁned by
Ex(Σ) = S(E(Σ)).
The following semantical characterization of scenario-scenario extrapolation will be extremely useful:
Proposition 1.
Traj
(
Ex(Σ)
)
(t) = {τ (t) ∣∣ τ ∈min(,Traj(Σ))}.
Proof. Ex(Σ) = S(E(Σ)). Therefore, from Observation 1 we get τ |
 Ex(Σ) if and only if there exist τ 1, . . . , τ N in Traj(E(Σ))
such that τ = τ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τ N , that is, if and only if there exist τ 1, . . . , τ N in min(,Traj(Σ)) such that for every t , τ (t) =
τ t(t). 
Corollary 2.1. Ex(Σ) = 〈σ(1), . . . , σ (N)〉 where for every t, Mod(σ (t)) = {τ (t) | τ ∈min(,Traj(Σ))}.
This corollary is straightforward, and so is the following:
Observation 4.
1. For any scenario Σ , we have E(Σ) |
 Ex(Σ) |
 Σ .
2. For any temporal formula Φ , we have E(Φ) |
 S(E(Φ)) |
 S(Φ) and E(Φ) |
 Φ |
 S(Φ).
Example 5. Let V = {a} and N = 2. The four possible trajectories are τ 1 = 〈a,a〉, τ 2 = 〈a,¬a〉, τ 3 = 〈¬a,a〉 and τ 4 =
〈¬a,¬a〉. Consider the preference relation  deﬁned by τ 1 ∼ τ 4 ≺ τ 2 ∼ τ 3.
• Let Σ = 〈,〉. We have Traj(Σ) = {τ 1, τ 2, τ 3, τ 4} and min(,Traj(Σ)) = {τ 1, τ 4}, from which we get E(Σ) = (a(1) ∧
a(2)) ∨ (¬a(1) ∧¬a(2)) and Ex(Σ) = Ex((1) ∧(2)) = 〈,〉.
• Let Φ = a(1) ⊕ a(2) . E(Φ) = (a(1) ∧¬a(2))∨ (¬a(1) ∧ a(2)), and Mod(S(E(Φ))(1)) = {τ 2(1), τ 3(1)} = {a,¬a}, and similarly
for t = 2. Finally, Ex(S(Φ)) = 〈,〉.
4 Examples of preference relations which are not change-based are relations where the context of the change is relevant. For instance, the relation in
which a trajectory is preferred if it satisﬁes a∧ b as soon as possible, deﬁned as follows, is not change-based:
τ  τ ′ if and only if min{t, τ (t) |
 a∧ b}min{t, τ ′(t) |
 a∧ b}.
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This example shows that unlike formula–formula extrapolation, scenario–scenario extrapolation generally leads to a loss
of information. This is due to the fact that for a given set X of trajectories there is generally no scenario Σ such that
Traj(Σ) = X .
3. Some extrapolation operators
We now give several examples of typical, inertial preference relations and associated extrapolation operators. Although
many applications need preference relations that are not change-based, the family of change-based extrapolation opera-
tors include a lot of simple and natural operators, and focusing on them is a good start. Since change-based preference
relations are induced from a preference relation  on change sets, therefore it is generally simpler to deﬁne them by the
corresponding preference relation on change sets.
Recall that the change set of a trajectory τ contains all pairs 〈 f , t〉 such that literal f becomes true at time t in τ .
Although there are as many change-based preference relations as preference relations on the set of all possible change sets,
there is a reasonable number of prototypical change-based relations obtained by making some natural neutrality assump-
tions on ﬂuents and on time points. If this neutrality assumption is relaxed, then it is possible to reﬁne the preference
relations by considering that changes concerning some particular ﬂuent (or time points) are more important than changes
concerning other ﬂuents (or time points). We now give a structured list containing all those natural change-based prefer-
ence relations (and their associated extrapolation operators) then we discuss the extension of these natural principles to
non-neutral preference relations.
3.1. Natural change-based preference relations
To deﬁne a natural preference relation on change sets, there are two relevant parameters (see Fig. 4): the part of the
change set that suﬃces to deﬁne the preference relation, and the principle used to compare the relevant pieces of informa-
tion in two change sets (as we shall see, these two parameters are not entirely independent). The relevant information from
the change sets that suﬃces to deﬁne the preference relation may concern:
• only the time points where some change occurs;
• only the literals involved in some change;
• only the variables involved in some change;
• the pairs (time point, literal) involved in some change, i.e., the whole change set;
• the pairs (time point, variable) involved in some change.
Finally, a change-based preference relation that we call basic needs only the information whether the change set is empty
or not. For each of these, we need to distinguish whether several occurrences are counted for once or many (for instance,
whether k changes at the same time point should count for k changes or just for one), and, in some cases, whether they
should be ranked along with their chronological order of occurrence. To distinguish several occurrences, we make use of
multisets. Formally, a multiset μ on a reference set S is a mapping from S to N, where μ(s) is the number of occurrences
of s in μ. Cardinality and inclusion of multisets are deﬁned as usually |μ| =∑s∈S μ(s) and μ ⊆ μ′ if μ(s)μ′(s) holds for
every s ∈ S .
In the following, let γ and γ ′ be two change sets.
3.1.1. Time points only
Recall that ChTime(γ ) is the set of time points where at least one change occurs in γ . The neutral two preference
relations that can be deﬁned from ChTime(γ ) make use of set cardinality and set inclusion:
nct γ  γ ′ if |ChTime(γ )| |ChTime(γ ′)|.
ict γ  γ ′ if ChTime(γ ) ⊆ ChTime(γ ′).
nct (nct standing for number of change time points) prefers trajectories in which changes occur fewer time points, whereas
ict (ict standing for inclusion of change time points) considers two trajectories as incomparable as soon as each of them
contains a time point where a change occurs in it and not in the other one.
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time-points set cardinality nct
inclusion ict
multi-set cardinality nc
inclusion ncpt
literals (resp. variables) set cardinality ncl (resp. ncv)
inclusion icl (resp. icv)
multi-set cardinality nc (resp. nc)
inclusion ncpl (resp. ncpv)
sequence dominance cseq (resp. cseqv)
〈literal, time point〉 set cardinality nc (resp. nc)
(resp. 〈variable, time point〉) inclusion csi (resp. csiv)
boolean singleton identity basic
(true if there is a change)
Fig. 4. The 15 natural neutral preference relations.
Fig. 5. The 3 nc -preferred trajectories satisfying Σ = 〈a,a ∨ c,b,¬a∨¬b,¬c〉.
Example 3 (Continued). The trajectories τ 7 = 〈m1,m1,m6,m6,m6〉 and τ 1 = 〈m2,m2,m2,m4,m4〉 belongs to the set of the
10 trajectories that satisfy Σ = 〈a,a ∨ c,b,¬a ∨ ¬b,¬c〉 and that are preferred for nct . All these 10 preferred trajectories
have only one instant of change (concerning one or several literals).
There are 26 ict -preferred trajectories, including the 10 nct -preferred trajectories and others, namely 〈m4,m5,m5,m5,
m2〉 for instance.
Now, ChTime(γ ) does not distinguish time points with a single change from time points with several changes. De-
ﬁne MChTime(γ ) as the multiset containing, for every time point t , the number of occurrences of changes 〈 f , t〉 in γ :
MChTime(γ ) is a mapping from T to N, and MChTime(γ )(t) is the number of pairs 〈 f , t〉 in Ch(τ ). The natural criteria used
above are still relevant:
nc γ  γ ′ if |MChTime(γ )| |MChTime(γ ′)|.
ncpt γ  γ ′ if MChTime(γ ) ⊆ MChTime(γ ′).
nc simply prefers trajectories with a minimal number of changes, whereas ncpt prefers trajectories minimizing the
number of changes per time point.
Example 3 (Continued). The following 3 trajectories satisfying Σ are preferred for nc :
τ 1 = 〈m2,m2,m2,m4,m4〉,
τ 2 = 〈m2,m2,m2,m6,m6〉,
τ 3 = 〈m2,m2,m6,m6,m6〉
with the respective change sets {〈¬b,4〉}, {〈¬a,4〉} and {〈¬a,3〉} (see Fig. 5). The same trajectories are preferred for ncpt
together with the trajectory 〈m1,m5,m5,m5,m6〉 (with a change set: {〈¬a,2〉, 〈¬c,5〉}).
3.1.2. Literals (resp. variables) only
Recall that ChLit(γ ) is the set of literals that change to true at least once in γ . Let MChLit(γ ) be the multiset containing,
for every literal l, the number of times a change 〈l, t〉 is present in γ . Then we get the following three natural preference
relations:
ncl γ  γ ′ if |ChLit(γ )| |ChLit(γ ′)|.
icl γ  γ ′ if ChLit(γ ) ⊆ ChLit(γ ′).
ncpl γ  γ ′ if MChLit(γ ) ⊆ MChLit(γ ′).
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prefers the trajectories minimizing the number of changes per literal. The fourth natural preference relations that we could
deﬁne by |MChLit(γ )| |MChLit(γ ′)|, simply compares trajectories according to the number of changes they contain but it
coincides with the already deﬁned preference relation nc .
Example 3 (Continued). The trajectories τ 1, τ 2 and τ 3 are the ncl , icl and ncpl preferred trajectories satisfying Σ .
Now, beyond considering sets or multisets of changing literals, we may consider a richer structure, where the infor-
mation on the relative order of changes is kept. The reason for that is that we may want to compare change sequences
independently of the precise location of changes in time: only the changes involved and the order in which they oc-
curred are relevant. Consider the sequence SChLit(γ ) obtained from ChLit(γ ) by clustering the changes that occur at the
same time point and ranking these clusters chronologically. More formally, write ChTime(γ ) = {t1, . . . , t|ChTime(γ )|} where
t1 < · · · < t|ChTime(γ )| , then SChLit(γ ) is the sequence of sets of literals, of length |ChTime(γ )| deﬁned by SChLit(γ )i = γ (ti)
for i ∈ 1, |ChTime(γ )|. For instance, SChLit(Ch(τ 0)) = 〈{¬a}, {b}, {¬b,¬c}〉.
cseq γ  γ ′ if there is an injective monotonic mapping F from 1, |SChLit(γ )| to 1, |SChLit(γ ′)|, such that: ∀t ∈
1, |SChLit(γ )|, SChLit(γ )(t) ⊆ SChLit(γ ′)(F (t))
Note that τ ∼cseq τ ′ if and only if the literals which change in τ and in τ ′ are the same and strictly in the same order. We call
the preference relation cseq change sequence dominance.
Example 3 (Continued). The three preferred trajectories with respect to cseq are τ 1, τ 2 and τ 3. Notice that τ 2 ≺cseq τ 4,
that τ 4 ∼cseq τ 5 ∼cseq τ 6, and that τ 7 and τ 5 are incomparable, as well as τ 7 and τ 6: indeed, Ch(τ 7) = {〈¬a,3〉, 〈¬c,3〉},
i.e., the changes from ¬a to a and from c to ¬c occur simultaneously, while for τ 4, τ 5 and τ 6, the change from ¬a to a
occurs before the change from c to ¬c.
In some cases, we may want to be indifferent between a change from v to ¬v and a change from ¬v to v , which
leads to the following “unsigned” versions of all preference relations based on ChLit(γ ), MChLit(γ ) and SChlit(γ ). Formally,
let γu = {〈v, t〉 | 〈v, t〉 ∈ γ or 〈¬v, t〉 ∈ γ }, and for every variable v , γu(v) = γ (v) ∪ γ (¬v). Then ChVar(γ ), MChVar(γ )
and SChVar(γ ) are deﬁned similarly as ChLit(γ ), MChLit(γ ) and SChlit(γ ), and the corresponding preference relations are
deﬁned mutatis mutandis. We call these preference relations unsigned and denote them by ncv, icv, ncpv and cseqv.
Example 3 (Continued). The preferred trajectories are the same for ncv and icv ; there are 12, including τ 1, τ 2 and
τ 3 but also trajectories admitting only one changing variable, such as 〈m2,m4,m2,m4,m2〉, whose change set is γ =
{〈¬b,2〉, 〈b,3〉, 〈¬b,4〉, 〈b,5〉}.
3.1.3. Full change set
There are two natural ways of deﬁning preference relations from the whole change set, either by using inclusion or
cardinality. If we use inclusion then we obtain csi (csi standing for change set inclusion); if we use cardinality, again we
obtain nc , therefore we don’t mention it.
csi γ  γ ′ if γ ⊆ γ ′ .
csi can also be deﬁned from the unsigned change set γu :
csiv γ  γ ′ if γu ⊆ γ ′u .
Example 3 (Continued). The following 6 trajectories satisfying Σ = 〈a,a ∨ c,b,¬a ∨ ¬b,¬c〉 are preferred for csi and also
for csiv : τ 1, τ 2, τ 3 together with τ 4 = 〈m1,m5,m5,m5,m6〉, τ 5 = 〈m1,m5,m5,m6,m6〉 and τ 6 = 〈m1,m5,m6,m6,m6〉
(whose change sets are, respectively, {〈¬a,2〉, 〈¬c,5〉}, {〈¬a,2〉, 〈¬c,4〉} and {〈¬a,2〉, 〈¬c,3〉}).
Using cardinality of the unsigned change set would give again nc , because a positive and negative change of a variable
can only occur at different time points, and hence will count for two changes for nc, as it will count for two changes in the
unsigned change set.
3.1.4. “Basic” preference relation
In addition to all these, if the relevant information is the binary predicate Empty(γ ), deﬁned by Empty(γ ) = 1 if γ = ∅
and Empty(γ ) = 0 if γ = ∅, then the basic preference relation is deﬁned by:
basic γ  γ ′ if Empty(γ ) Empty(γ ′).
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ferred.
3.2. Reﬁning natural preference relations by relaxing neutrality
The preference relations deﬁned above can be generalized by giving up the assumption that all time points (respectively
literals, variables) are equally important. Levels of importance can be expressed either numerically, associating weights with
time points and/or literals or variables, or qualitatively, using priority relations (on time points, literals, etc.).
Because time points are already chronologically rank-ordered, a natural way of breaking neutrality consists in giving
priority to later or earlier time points in change sets. For instance, csi can be reﬁne into a preference relation that prefers
trajectories where changes occurs as late as possible. This policy is called chronological minimization in [31] and is extensively
discussed in [27]. It is deﬁned as follows:
chr γ  γ ′ if γ = γ ′ or there exists k ∈ 1,N such that
{
γ (k) ⊂ γ ′(k),
∀t < k, γ (t) = γ ′(t).
Example 3 (Continued). The preferred trajectories for chr are τ 1 and τ 2, where the ﬁrst change occurs at time point 4.
Similar reﬁnements can be done for ict and ncpt . However, chronological minimization does not make sense for icl
or ncpl , since ChLit(γ ) and MChLit(γ ) do not convey any information about time points. Lastly, instead of preferring
trajectories in which changes occur as late as possible, one can choose to prefer trajectories in which changes occur as early
as possible (“anti-chronological minimization”).
Another natural way of breaking neutrality consists in attaching a penalty to each possible change. For instance, the
following reﬁnement of nc consists in assuming that the penalty depends only on the literal involved in the change, and
that some ﬂuents can change more easily than others. In this case, let k : LIT → N∗ , where k(l) is the penalty induced by
a change from ¬l to l. Note that we do not necessarily have k(l) = k(¬l), for instance, obviously, k(alive) < k(¬alive). Now,
the cost of a change set γ is deﬁned by:
K (γ ) =
N∑
t=2
∑
l∈γ (t)
k(l).
penalty (k) γ  γ ′ if K (γ ) K (γ ′).
The reason why we impose that changes have a strictly positive penalty is to impose inertia. Note that we recover nc by
letting k(l) = 1 for all l.
All the preference relations deﬁned so far in this section consider atomic changes as independent. It may be the case,
however, that ﬂuents do not change independently from each other. This is the case when changes are caused by events.
The following model is taken (and slightly adapted) from [7], where the plausibility of events, as well as their dynamics,
are modeled by ordinal conditional functions. Let E be a ﬁnite set of events containing the “null” event e∅ . For every event
e ∈ E and every pair of states (m,m′), κ(m′ |m, e) ∈ N ∪ {∞} measures the plausibility that m′ results when e occurs at m,
with the usual convention the higher κ(m′ | m, e), the more exceptional the transition from m to m′ . Moreover, for every
state m and event e, κ(e |m) ∈ N ∪ {∞} measures the plausibility that e occurs in m.
Note that since we want to assume that the system is inert, we impose that the two following conditions necessarily
hold (see [7] for a discussion, as well as for examples or event models):
1. for any e and m: κ(e |m) = 0 if and only if e = e∅;
2. for any m, m′: κ(m′ |m, e∅) = 0 if and only if m =m′ .
An event model E = (E, κ) consists of E and the two collections of κ-functions described above. Given an event model
E , the plausibility of the transition from m to m′ through e is κE (e,m,m′) = κ(e |m) + κ(m′ |m, e), and the plausibility of
the transition from m to m′ is deﬁned as κE (m,m′) =mine∈E κE (e,m,m′).
Lastly, the plausibility of a trajectory τ is deﬁned by κE (τ ) = ∑N−1t=1 κE (τ (t), τ (t + 1)). Note that if τ is static then
obviously, κE (τ ) = 0, and if τ is not static then one of the events in the sequence must be different from e∅ and thus
κE (τ ) > 0. Hence the conditions imposed on κ well ensure that inertia corresponds to normality, and consequently, the
event-based preference relation deﬁned below prefers inert trajectory:
event penalty (E) τ  τ ′ if κE (τ ) κE (τ ′).
Note that since the effects of events generally depend on the initial state, knowing Ch(τ ) and Ch(τ ′) is generally not enough
to decide whether τ E τ ′ , i.e., event-based preference relations are generally not change-based.
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have given three ways of reﬁning them. Since it would be tedious to study them all, in the rest of the paper we will focus
on a few representative, “prototypical” preference relations among these.
4. Extrapolation and revision
We ﬁrst need to recall some background on belief revision. Rather than the usual presentation of revision by Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors and Makinson [1], that views revision as mapping a closed logical theory K and an input formula α to a closed
logical theory K  α, we choose here the syntactical presentation of Katsuno and Mendelzon [19], which views revision as
mapping a propositional formula ϕ (representing the initial belief state) and another propositional formula α (the “input”)
to a propositional formula ϕ  α (representing the belief state after revision by α). This simpliﬁcation is without loss of
generality whenever the propositional language is generated by a ﬁnite set of propositional symbols (which is the case in
this paper). Under this assumption, the postulates listed by [1] correspond to the following ones [19]:
R1 ϕ  α |
 α.
R2 If ϕ ∧ α is satisﬁable then ϕ  α ≡ ϕ ∧ α.
R3 If α is satisﬁable then ϕ  α is satisﬁable.
R4 If ϕ ≡ ϕ′ and α ≡ β then ϕ  α ≡ ϕ′  β .
R5 (ϕ  α)∧ β |
 ϕ  (α ∧ β).
R6 If (ϕ  α)∧ β is satisﬁable then ϕ  (α ∧ β) |
 (ϕ  α)∧ β .
Given a propositional language L , a revision operator is a mapping
 :L ×L →L
satisfying R1 to R6. Katsuno and Mendelzon [19] then establish the following representation theorem (similar to the main
representation theorem in [1]):
Proposition 2. (See [19].)  is a revision operator if and only if there exists an assignment mapping any formula ϕ to a complete
preorder ϕ onM = 2V for every propositional formula ϕ , such that
1. the assignment is faithful, i.e.,
(1a) if m |
 ϕ and m′ |
 ϕ then mϕ m′
(1b) if m |
 ϕ and m′ |
 ¬ϕ then m <ϕ m′
(where <ϕ is deﬁned from ϕ by m <ϕ m′ iff mϕ m′ and not m′ ϕ m);
2. m |
 ϕ  α if and only if m ∈Min(ϕ,Mod(α)).
Belief revision is often thought of as dealing with static worlds, therefore with formulae pertaining to the same time point.
However, as remarked in [15], “what is important for revision is not that the world is static, but that the propositions used
to describe the world are static”. That is, nothing prevents us from considering revision operators in a language generated
from a set of time-stamped propositional symbols. Consider then a revision operator  on L(N) . Because an interpretation
of L(N) corresponds to a trajectory of TRAJ(N) , rewriting the above result for L(N) leads us to say that it is possible to map
faithfully Φ to a complete preorder Φ on TRAJ(N) for every temporal formula Φ , such that for every temporal formula Ψ ,
(3) τ |
 Φ  Ψ if and only if τ ∈Min(Φ,Traj(Ψ )).
Let us compare (3) with the deﬁnition of extrapolation: Mod(E(Ψ )) = {τ | τ ∈Min(,Traj(Ψ ))}, or, equivalently,
(4) τ |
 E(Ψ ) if and only if τ ∈Min
(
,Traj(Ψ )
)
, where  is inertial.
Thus, extrapolating a temporal formula Ψ is equivalent to revise some initial belief state (that we shall call Φ) by Ψ . What
does this initial belief state correspond to? Φ should be such that any given complete preorder assigned faithfully to Φ , Φ ,
is inertial. This means that any two static trajectories should be indifferent with respect to Φ and that if τ is static and
τ ′ is not, then τ <Φ τ ′ must hold. Hence, the models of Φ are the static trajectories. Let PERS =∧v∈V ∧N−1t=1 vt ↔ vt+1 be
the temporal formula having for models the set of static trajectories (PERS is true if and only if no change occurs between
time 1 and time N). We have just shown above that revising PERS by Ψ is equivalent to extrapolating Ψ . This leads to the
following result:
Proposition 3. For every extrapolation operator E , there exists a revision operator  onL(N) such that for everyΦ ∈L(N) , E(Φ) ≡
PERS  Φ .
For any revision operator  there exists a unique extrapolation operator E such that for every Φ ∈L(N) , E(Φ) ≡ PERS  Φ .5
5 Note that if we do not require  to be inertial, a more general version of Proposition 3 holds, where PERS is replaced by a temporal formula Σ such
that Traj(Σ) =Min(,TRAJ(N)).
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associated extrapolation operator. Take any assignment Ψ  →Ψ such that for any Ψ ≡ PERS, Ψ = and for any Ψ ≡ PERS,
Ψ is any ordering satisfying the faithfulness conditions (1) and (2). This assignment is faithful6: for Ψ = PERS this is
obvious from the construction, and for Ψ ≡ PERS, (1a) is satisﬁed because for every two static trajectories τ , τ ′ we have
τ |
 PERS and τ ′ |
 PERS, therefore τ ∼ τ ′; (1b) is satisﬁed because if τ |
 PERS and τ ′ |
 ¬PERS we have τ ≺ τ ′ (because
 is inertial). Finally, deﬁne  by (3). we have τ |
 PERS  Φ if and only if τ ∈ Min(PERS,Traj(Φ)), that is, if and only if
τ |
 E(Φ).
Conversely, a revision operator  on L(N) induces a unique extrapolation operator E , deﬁned by E = EPERS , where
PERS is the faithful preorder associated with  and the initial belief state PERS. 
Therefore, belief extrapolation is a speciﬁc instance of belief revision (on a time-stamped language): extrapolation amounts to
revising the prior belief that all ﬂuents persist throughout time by the observations. This in turn allows us for deriving easily a
representation theorem for extrapolation. We need ﬁrst to rewrite the Katsuno–Mendelzon postulates in the language of
extrapolation:
Let E be an extrapolation operator and Φ a temporal formula.
E1 E(Φ) |
 Φ .
E2 If PERS∧ Φ is satisﬁable then E(Φ) ≡ PERS∧ Φ .
E3 If Φ is satisﬁable then E(Φ) is satisﬁable.
E4 If Φ ≡ Φ ′ then E(Φ) ≡ E(Φ ′).
E5 E(Φ) ∧ Φ ′ |
 E(Φ ∧ Φ ′).
E6 If E(Φ) ∧ Φ ′ is consistent then E(Φ ∧ Φ ′) |
 E(Φ) ∧ Φ ′ .
E1 expresses that observations are reliable, therefore extrapolation may only complete the observations, without ques-
tioning their truth. E3 expresses that any consistent formula can be extrapolated. E4 is a syntax-independence property. E5
and E6 together are equivalent to: if E(Φ) ∧ Φ ′ is consistent then E(Φ ∧ Φ ′) is equivalent to E(Φ) ∧ Φ ′: when there are
some trajectories satisfying both E(Φ) and Φ ′ then the trajectories satisfying E(Φ ∧ Φ ′) are obtained by retaining in the
trajectories satisfying E(Φ) those that satisfy Φ ′ . Finally, E2 is an inertia assumption: if it can be consistently assumed that
no change occurred, then we jump to this conclusion. Note that when Φ is a scenario Σ , (E2) comes down to
E2S If
∧N
t=1 Σ(t) is satisﬁable then for every t  N , E(Σ)(t) ≡
∧N
t=1 Σ(t).
An immediate – but important – property deriving from E1, E4 and E5 is that extrapolation is idempotent:
Observation 5. E1, E4 and E5 imply E(E(Φ)) ≡ E(Φ).
Proof. E1 implies that E(E(Φ)) |
 E(Φ). Take Φ ′ = E(Φ) in E5, we get (a) E(Φ)∧ E(Φ) |
 E(Φ ∧ E(Φ)). Since, from E1, we
have E(Φ) |
 Φ , it means that (b) Φ ∧ E(Φ) ≡ E(Φ). From (a) and (b) and E4, we get E(Φ) |
 E(E(Φ)). 
We said above that these postulates E1–E6 correspond to the postulates R1–R6. This is expressed more formally as
follows:
Lemma 1. Let E :L(N) →L(N) be a complete extrapolation operator, and  any revision operator such that E is induced by . Then,
for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,6},  satisﬁes Ri if and only if E satisﬁes Ei.
Proof. From Proposition 3, given a revision operator  there is only one extrapolation operator E induced by . Since  is a
revision operator, it satisﬁes postulates R1–R6 which are true for every formulae ϕ,ϕ′,α and β , taking PERS for ϕ and for
ϕ′ , and taking Φ and Φ ′ for α and β respectively, R1–R6 translate immediately into E1–E6. 
Now, the representation theorem (for complete extrapolation operators):
Proposition 4. E :L(N) →L(N) is a complete extrapolation operator if and only if it satisﬁes E1 to E6.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 3, Lemma 1 and Proposition 2. 
6 Note that a time-stamped propositional language is a standard propositional language, therefore the deﬁnition of a faithful assignment does not need
to be redeﬁned.
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ings, but intuitively, it is natural to expect such orderings to be incomplete, allowing two trajectories to be incomparable.
Incomplete extrapolation operators can also be characterized by a set of postulates), as follows:
Proposition 5. Let us consider the two following postulates:
E7 If E(Φ) |
 Φ ′ and E(Φ ′) |
 Φ then E(Φ) ≡ E(Φ ′).
E8 E(Φ) ∧ E(Φ ′) |
 E(Φ ∧ Φ ′).
E is a partial extrapolation operator if and only if it satisﬁes E1–E5, E7, E8.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for complete operators (Proposition 4), replacing Proposition 2 by Theorem 5.2 in
[19]. 
Now that we know that, technically speaking, an extrapolation operator is a revision operator on a time-stamped lan-
guage where the initial belief state is ﬁxed (to PERS), the question is, is it nothing more than that? The answer is both positive
and negative. Positive, because indeed, any extrapolation operator can be seen as a revision operator. Negative, because the
temporal structure makes extrapolation a speciﬁc class of belief change operators with its speciﬁc properties, that makes
it worth studying on its own: in other terms, extrapolation is much more speciﬁc than revision, and focusing on this speci-
ﬁcity is worth investigating. In Section 5 we will study a few speciﬁc temporal properties of extrapolation, which would
be meaningless in a standard, atemporal belief revision framework. The discussion on the speciﬁcity of extrapolation with
respect to plain belief revision will be continued in the conclusion.
We end this section by brieﬂy discussing the possible connections between extrapolation and iterated belief revision. As
there are quite many works on iterated revision, it would be tedious to compare extrapolation with them all. We choose to
compare it with one speciﬁc approach, namely Lehmann’s iterated revision [22], because it considers sequences of consistent
formulae,7 therefore the input is, formally speaking, the same as in scenario extrapolation. In [22], an iterated revision
function maps any sequence of formulae σ = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 to a belief state [σ ] resulting from the sequence σ of individual
revisions. Since [22] is only concerned with the ﬁnal result of the iterated revision process, what we can compare given a
scenario Σ is the belief resulting from Σ , denoted by Traj(Σ), with the projection of the extrapolation at the ﬁnal time
point Ex(Σ)↓N (where N = |Σ |).8 The difference between extrapolation and iterated revision is clear when considering the
following example: let Σ = 〈a → b,a,¬a〉; any “reasonable” extrapolation operator (including all extrapolation operators
deﬁned in Section 3) satisﬁes Ex(Σ) = 〈a ∧ b,a ∧ b,¬a ∧ b〉 (the change from a to ¬a between 2 and 3 being certain,
the preferred trajectory is the one containing no other changes). Now, Lehmann’s iterated revision, and also most iterated
revision operators deﬁned on epistemic states (e.g., [4,9]) give [a → b,a,¬a] = ¬a. The reason for this difference is that
iterated revision is concerned with pieces of information concerning a static world; what evolves is the agent’s belief state,
not the state of the world. Therefore, once the new information ¬a has “cancelled” the preceding one, the reasons to
believe in b have disappeared. This strong “directivity” of time in iterated revision contrasts with extrapolation, where past
and future can often be interchanged (as soon as the property (R) is satisﬁed, as we shall see in Section 5).
5. Temporal properties of extrapolation
We now consider temporal properties of some extrapolation operators, i.e., properties that explicitly refer to the ﬂow of
time. The ﬁrst and perhaps most important of these temporal properties is inertia, which has already been discussed, and
which is, by deﬁnition, satisﬁed by all extrapolation operators. We now consider properties that are not always satisﬁed.
For each of these, we discuss the relevance and desirability of the property and we list, among the “typical” extrapolation
operators, which ones satisfy it.
5.1. Reversibility
Reversibility expresses that “forward” persistence (inferring beliefs from the past to the future) and “backward” per-
sistence (inferring beliefs from the future to the past) are symmetric. Even if reversibility is not necessarily a desirable
property, it is however interesting to see which operators satisfy it and which ones do not, since this property tells a lot
about the nature of extrapolation operators. In particular, as we shall see soon, reversibility holds for many of the “typical”
7 Other approaches to iterated belief revision act on epistemic states rather than on sequences of formulae and the comparison with extrapolation is
more complex to establish.
8 Among the postulates for iterated revision [22], it can be shown that the operator Σ  → Ex(Σ)↓N , where Ex is a scenario extrapolation operator, satisﬁes
I1, I2, I3, I5 and I6, and does not satisfy I4 nor I7 (we omit both the postulates and the proofs, since this point is of minor importance). Thus, Lehmann is
right when saying that for a belief change operator on a changing situation, “one would probably accept all the postulates [. . .] except I4 and I7” [22].
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obviously don’t satisfy it.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the reversal of a trajectory and of a temporal formula. We recall that N is the number of time points
considered.
Deﬁnition 9 (Reversal of trajectories and formulae). For any trajectory τ , the reversal of τ is deﬁned by
reverse(τ )(t) = τ (N − t + 1).
For any temporal formula Φ , the reversal of Φ is:
Reverse(Φ) = Φ ′
such that Φ ′ is the formula Φ in which each occurrence of a variable x(t) is replaced by x(N−t+1) .
Remark that in the particular case where Φ is a scenario Σ = 〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(N)〉, the deﬁnition simpliﬁes to Reverse(Σ) =
〈Σ(N), . . . ,Σ(1)〉. Next, we introduce the reversibility property:
Deﬁnition 10 (Reversibility). An extrapolation operator satisﬁes reversibility (R) if and only if for every temporal formula
Φ ∈L(N) , we have Reverse(E(Φ)) = E(Reverse(Φ)).
We have the following semantical characterization of reversibility. A preference relation  is said to be reversible if and
only if for every τ , τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) , τ ≺ τ ′ holds if and only if reverse(τ ) ≺ reverse(τ ′).
Proposition 6. E satisﬁes (R) if and only if  is reversible.
Proof. Let  be a reversible preference relation over TRAJ(N) , and consider the extrapolation operator E . We have the
following chain of equivalences:
τ |
 Reverse(E(Φ))
⇔ ∀t ∈ [1..N], τ (t) |
 Reverse(E(Φ))(t)
⇔ ∀t ∈ [1..N], τ (N − t + 1) |
 Reverse(E(Φ))(N − t + 1)
⇔ reverse(τ ) |
 E(Φ)
⇔ reverse(τ ) |
 Φ and τ ′ |
 Φ s.t. τ ′ ≺ reverse(τ )
⇔ τ |
 Reverse(Φ) and τ ′′ |
 Reverse(Φ) s.t. reverse(τ ′′) ≺ reverse(τ )
⇔ τ |
 Reverse(Φ) and τ ′′ |
 Reverse(Φ) s.t. τ ′′ ≺ τ (reversibility of )
⇔ τ ∈min(,Traj(Reverse(Φ))
⇔ τ |
 E
(
Reverse(Φ)
)
.
Hence, E satisﬁes (R).
Conversely, assume  is not reversible. Then there exist two trajectories τ , τ ′ such that τ ≺ τ ′ and reverse(τ ) ≺
reverse(τ ′). Let Φ be the temporal formula (unique up to logical equivalence) such that Traj(Φ) = {τ , τ ′}. Because
τ ≺ τ ′ , we have τ ′ |
 E(Φ). Now, Traj(Reverse(Φ)) = {reverse(τ ), reverse(τ ′)}, and since reverse(τ ) ≺ reverse(τ ′), we have
reverse(τ ′) |
 E(Reverse(Φ)), that is, τ ′ |
 Reverse(E(Reverse(Φ))). Therefore, E(Φ) ≡ Reverse(E(Reverse(Φ)), that is,
Reverse(E(Φ)) ≡ E(Reverse(Φ)), hence E does not satisfy (R). 
Reversibility is strongly linked to the equal plausibility of a change from a to ¬a and vice versa, as it can be seen on the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. If  is change-based then  is reversible if the following holds for its associated relation :
for any change sets γ , γ ′, γ  γ ′ if and only if rev(γ )  rev(γ ′)
where rev(γ ) = {〈¬ f ,N − t + 2〉 | 〈 f , t〉 ∈ γ }.
Proof. By deﬁnition of rev, rev(Ch(τ )) = Ch(reverse(τ )). Now,  is change-based, therefore τ ≺ τ ′ ⇔ Ch(τ )  Ch(τ ′). As-
suming that  veriﬁes the equivalence γ  γ ′ if and only if rev(γ )  rev(γ ′) for any change sets γ and γ ′ , we get that
rev(Ch(τ ))  rev(Ch(τ ′)), which is equivalent to Ch(reverse(τ ))  Ch(reverse(τ ′)), i.e., reverse(τ ) ≺ reverse(τ ′). 
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reversibility.
Proposition 7.
• Enct , Eict , Enc , Encpt , Encl , Encv , Eicl , Eicv , Encpl , Encpv Ecseq , Ecseqv , Ecsi , Ecsiv , Ebasic satisfy (R);
• Ek satisﬁes (R) if and only if ∀l ∈ LIT we have k(l) = k(¬l);
Proof. The function rev from change sets to change sets deﬁned by rev(〈 f , t〉) = 〈¬ f ,N − t + 2〉 is bijective, therefore the
condition (C) γ  γ ′ if and only if rev(γ )  rev(γ ′) is obviously satisﬁed for csi , csiv and nc . For every literal l, rev is
a one-to-one correspondence between γ (l) and rev(γ )(¬l), therefore (C) is satisﬁed by ncpl and icl . For every variable
v , rev is a one-to-one correspondence between γ (v) and rev(γ )(v), therefore (C) is satisﬁed by ncpv and icv . For every
time point t , rev is a one-to-one correspondence between γ (t) and rev(γ )(N − t + 2), therefore (C) is satisﬁed by ncpt
and ict . If there is an injective, literal-preserving, time-monotonic function θ from γ to γ ′ then deﬁne θ ′ from rev(γ ) to
rev(γ ′) as follows: if θ(〈 f , t〉) = 〈 f , t′〉 then θ ′(〈¬ f ,N − t + 2〉) = 〈¬ f ,N − t′ + 2〉. Then θ ′ is an injective, literal-preserving,
time-monotonic function from rev(γ ) to rev(γ ′), therefore (C) is satisﬁed by cseq . The case of cseqv is similar. Finally,
again because for every literal l, rev is a one-to-one correspondence between γ (l) and rev(γ )(¬l), we have k(rev(γ )) =∑
〈l,t〉∈γ k(¬l), therefore, if the penalty function is such that k(¬l) = k(l) for any literal l, then k(rev(γ )) = k(γ ), and (C) is
satisﬁed by k . 
If N > 2 then Echr does not satisfy (R). Indeed, let N = 3, V = {p} and take Φ = p(1) ∧ ¬p(3) , then we have Echr(Φ) =
p(1) ∧ p(2) ∧ ¬p(3) and Echr(Reverse(Φ)) = Echr(¬p(1) ∧ p(3)) = ¬p(1) ∧ ¬p(2) ∧ p(3) which differs from Reverse(Echr(Φ)) =
¬p(1) ∧ p(2) ∧ p(3) .
5.2. Markovianity
The meaning of Markovianity is exactly the same as dynamical systems: the way of extrapolating beliefs after time t
given that we know the state of the world at time t does not depend on the history of the system before t . Markovianity
is also useful from a computational point of view: as soon as we know the state of the world at k different time points,
we can decompose the extrapolation process into k + 1 smaller independent subprocesses. Transposed in our framework,
the property says that as soon as there is a complete observation at a given time point k, an extrapolation problem can
be decomposed into two independent subproblems: the ﬁrst one up to k and the second one from k on. For this we need
to work with families of extrapolation operators, parameterized by N , rather than for a ﬁxed N , and we slightly abuse
notations and use  for {N ,N ∈ N}, where N is a preference relation on TRAJ(N) . All “standard” preference relations,
including all those that we gave in Section 3, are naturally deﬁned for any N . Similarly, the length of scenarios can now
vary.
Notation 1. Let Σ = 〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(N)〉 be a scenario of length N and k N . Deﬁne the scenarios Σ→k and Σk→ , of respec-
tive lengths k and N − k+ 1, by Σ→k = 〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(k)〉 and Σk→ = 〈Σ(k), . . . ,Σ(N)〉.
Let TRAJ1→N = TRAJ(1) ∪ · · · ∪ TRAJ(N) be the set of all trajectories of length  N . If τ ∈ TRAJ(N) and 1  k  N then
we denote by τ→k and τ k→ the trajectories of respective lengths k and N − k + 1 s.t. τ→k = 〈τ (1), . . . , τ (k)〉 and τ k→ =
〈τ (k), . . . , τ (N)〉.
A scenario Σ is complete at k if Σ(k) is complete, i.e., has only one model.
Deﬁnition 11 (Markovianity). A scenario-scenario extrapolation operator Ex satisﬁes Markovianity (M) if and only if for any
scenario Σ such that Σ(k) is complete,
Ex(Σ)(t) =
{
Ex(Σ→k)(t) if t  k,
Ex(Σk→)(t − k+ 1) if t  k.
Note that Ex(Σ)(k) is well-deﬁned for t = k, because Σ(k) is complete, which implies that Ex(Σ)(k) = Ex(Σ→k)(k) =
Ex(Σk→)(1) = Σ(k).
Example 6. Let Σ = 〈¬a ∨ ¬b,a,a ∧ b,,¬a〉 and V = {a,b}. Σ(3) is complete. We have Σ→3 = 〈¬a ∨ ¬b,a,a ∧ b〉 and
Σ3→ = 〈a ∧ b,,¬a〉. Assume that Ex(Σ→3) = 〈a ⊕ b,a ∨ b,a ∧ b〉 and Ex(Σ3→) = 〈a ∧ b,b,¬a ∧ b〉 (which is the case, for
instance, for Excsi ), see Fig. 6. If Ex satisﬁes (M) then we must have Ex(Σ) = 〈a⊕ b,a∨ b,a∧ b,b,¬a∧ b〉.
We now give a suﬃcient condition for Markovianity.
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Deﬁnition 12. A preference relation  on TRAJ(N) is decomposable if there exists a partially ordered set 〈L,L〉, a function
μ : TRAJ1→N to L and a function  from L × L to L, such that:
• for any τ ∈ TRAJ(N) and any k ∈ 1,N, μ(τ) = μ(τ→k)μ(τ k→);
•  is strictly increasing (with respect to L ) in both arguments;
• for any τ , τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) , τ  τ ′ holds if and only if μ(τ)L μ(τ ′).
Proposition 8. If  is decomposable then Ex satisﬁes Markovianity.
Proof. Assume  is decomposable and let 〈L,L〉, μ and  as above. Let Σ such that Σ(k) is complete.
(1) Let τ |
 Ex(Σ). Let us show that τ→k |
 Ex(Σ→k). Suppose not. Then, using Proposition 1, there exists τ0 ∈ TRAJ(k)
such that τ0 |
 Σ→k and τ0 ≺ τ→k; the latter is equivalent to μ(τ0) <L μ(τ→k). Let τ ′ be deﬁned by τ ′(t) = τ0(t) if
t  k and τ ′(t) = τ (t) if t > k. Note that τ ′(k) = τ0(k) = τ (k) (since τ0 |
 Σ→k and τ |
 Σ and Σ(k) is complete). Because
μ(τ0) <L μ(τ
→k) and  is strictly increasing, μ(τ ′) = μ(τ0)μ(τ ′k→) < μ(τ→k)μ(τ ′k→) = μ(τ→k)μ(τ k→) = μ(τ),
therefore, τ ′ ≺ τ . Lastly, because τ0 |
 Σ→k and τ ′k→ = τ k→ |
 Σk→ , we have τ ′ |
 Σ , which contradicts τ |
 Ex(Σ).
Therefore, τ→k |
 Ex(Σ→k). A similar proof leads to τ k→ |
 Ex(Σk→).
(2) Conversely, let τ0 ∈ TRAJ(k) such that τ0 |
 Ex(Σ→k) and let τ1 ∈ TRAJ(N−k+1) such that τ1 |
 Ex(Σk→). Let τ be
deﬁned by τ (t) = τ0(t) if t  k and τ (t) = τ1(t − k + 1) if t  k. (Because Σ(k) is complete, the deﬁnition is consistent
at k.) Assume now that τ |
 Ex(Σ). Then there exists a τ ′ |
 Σ such that τ ′ ≺ τ , which entails μ(τ ′) <L μ(τ). We must
have either μ(τ ′→k) <L μ(τ→k) or μ(τ ′k→) <L μ(τ k→), otherwise by monotonicity of  we would have μ(τ ′) L μ(τ).
Assume without loss of generality that μ(τ ′→k) <L μ(τ→k). This means that τ ′→k ≺ τ→k = τ0. Moreover, τ ′ |
 Σ implies
τ ′→k |
 Σ→k , which together with τ ′→k ≺ τ0 contradicts τ0 |
 Ex(Σ→k). From (1) and (2), we have that τ |
 Ex(Σ) if and
only if τ→k |
 Ex(Σ→k) and τ k→ |
 Ex(Σk→). Let Σ be a scenario such that Σ(k) is complete. For every t  k, we have
Mod(Ex(Σ)(t)) = {τ (t) | τ |
 Ex(Σ)} = {τ→k(t) | τ→k |
 Ex(Σ→k)} = Mod(Ex(Σ→k)(t)), therefore, Ex(Σ)(t) = Ex(Σ→k(t)).
Similarly, for t > k, Ex(Σ)(t) = Ex(Σk→(t − k+ 1)). 
Proposition 9. The following scenario–scenario extrapolation operators satisfy (M): Exnct , Exict , Exnc , Exncpl , Excseq, Excsi , Exchr , Exk
and ExE .
Proof. In all cases, this is a consequence of Proposition 8, with the following choices for L, μ and :
• Exnc (resp. Exnct ): L = N; L=; μ(τ) = |Ch(τ )| (resp. |ChTime(τ )|); and = +. Things are similar for Exk with μ(τ)
being the penalty induced by all changes in τ , and for ExE with μ(τ) = κE (τ ).
• Exncpl: L = NLIT ; for all x, y ∈ L, xL y if and only if for every l ∈ LIT , x(l) y(l) and (x y)(l) = x(l) + y(l); μ(τ)(l) =
|Ch(τ )(l)|. Things are similar for Exncpv .
• Excsi : L = 〈2LIT×{1,...,N},⊆〉; μ(τ) = Ch(τ ); and μ(τ→k) μ(τ k→) = Ch(τ→k) ∪ {(l, t + k) | (l, t) ∈ Ch(τ k→)}. Things are
similar for Excseq and Exchr , with respectively L=cseq and L=chr . For Exict , L = 〈2{1,...,N},⊆〉; μ(τ) = ChTime(τ );
and μ(τ→k)μ(τ k→) = ChTime(τ→k) ∪ {t + k | t ∈ ChTime(τ k→)}.
• Excsiv : L = 〈2V ×{1,...,N},⊆〉; μ(τ) = Chu(τ ) = {〈v, t〉 | 〈v, t〉 or 〈¬v, t〉 ∈ Ch(τ )}; and μ(τ→k)  μ(τ k→) = Chu(τ→k) ∪
{(v, t + k) | (v, t) ∈ Chu(τ k→)}. 
The property fails typically for operators that use a global minimization like Exicl (Exncpt , Exncl , . . .). For this kind of
operators, the function  is not always strictly increasing. We give a counterexample for Exicl . Let Σ = 〈a,¬a,a∧b,¬a∨¬b〉,
and k = 3. There is only one icl-preferred trajectory satisfying Σ : 〈ab,¬ab,ab,¬ab〉 – the changing literals in this trajectory
are a and ¬a, and obviously we cannot ﬁnd anything better. Therefore, Exicl(Σ) = (a ∧ b,¬a ∧ b,a ∧ b,¬a ∧ b〉. However,
Exicl(Σ3→) = 〈a∧ b,a⊕ b〉, therefore, Exicl(Σ3→)(2) ≡ Exicl(Σ)(4), which shows that Exicl does not satisfy (M).
5.3. Independence from empty observations
An intuitive property consists in the extrapolation process being insensitive to empty observations, i.e., adding an empty
observation between two observations should not change anything to the way observations are extrapolated — or, in other
words, the choice of the time unit has no inﬂuence on extrapolated beliefs.
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Deﬁnition 13 (Independence from empty observations (IEO)). Ex satisﬁes (IEO) if for any scenario Σ of length N − 1, ∀p ∈
1,N,
Ex
(〈
Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(p − 1),,Σ(p), . . . ,Σ(N − 1)〉)≡ 〈ϕ1, . . . ,ϕp−1,ψ,ϕp, . . . ,ϕN−1〉
where 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉 = Ex(Σ), and for some propositional formula ψ .
Note that if (IEO) is satisﬁed, then given a scenario Σ of length N − 1, and letting successively p = N and p = 1 in
the previous identity, we get that Ex(〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(N − 1),〉) = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1,ψN 〉 and Ex(〈,Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(N − 1)〉) =
〈ψ1,ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉; this implies that
Ex
(〈
Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(N),〉)(t) = Ex(〈,Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(N)〉)(t + 1)
which expresses a kind of stationarity: the extrapolation process is invariant to a translation of the time scale.
Example 7. Let Σ1 = 〈,¬a ∨ ¬b,a ∨ b,a ∧ b〉 and Σ2 = 〈¬a ∨ ¬b,a ∨ b,a ∧ b,〉. We have Exnc(Σ1) = 〈a ⊕ b,a ⊕ b,a ∨
b,a∧ b〉 and Exnc(Σ2) = 〈a⊕ b,a∨ b,a∧ b,a∧ b〉 see Fig. 7. Hence, ∀t ∈ 1,3,Exnc(Σ1)(t + 1) ≡ Exnc(Σ2)(t). We will see in
Proposition 10 that Exnc indeed satisﬁes IEO.
We introduce the following notation: for any scenario Σ of length N − 1 and any p ∈ 1,N, push(Σ, p) is the scenario
resulting of “pushing” an empty observation  at time p in Σ :
push(Σ, p) = 〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(p − 1),,Σ(p), . . . ,Σ(N − 1)〉, ∀p ∈ 1,N.
We now give a useful suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for an extrapolation operator to satisfy (IEO).
Lemma 3. If  is change-monotonic and satisﬁes the following two properties
(1) for any p ∈ 2,N and τ ∈ TRAJ(N) , (τ→p−1.τ (p − 1).τ p+1→) τ ;
(2) for any τ1, τ2 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) , τ1  τ2 if and only if (τ→p−11 .τ1(p − 1).τ p→1 ) (τ→p−12 .τ2(p − 1).τ p→2 )
then Ex satisﬁes (IEO).
Proof. Let  be a change-monotonic preference relation satisfying (1) and (2), Σ a scenario of length N − 1 such that
Ex(Σ) = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉 and p ∈ 1,N. Let ψ = Ex(push(Σ, p))(p).
We ﬁrst consider the case p  2.
Let p  2. We ﬁrst show that Ex(push(Σ, p)) |
 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕp−1,ψ,ϕp, . . . , ϕN−1〉. Let τ ∈ TRAJ(N) such that τ |

Ex(push(Σ, p)), i.e., τ |
 〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(p − 1),,Σ(p), . . . ,Σ(N − 1)〉 and ∀τ ′ |
 push(Σ, p), τ ′ ≺ τ (a). Deﬁne τ0 ∈
TRAJ(N−1) by τ0 = (τ→p−1.τ p+1→) = 〈τ (1), . . . , τ (p − 1), τ (p + 1), . . . , τ (N)〉. We claim that τ0 |
 Ex(Σ). By deﬁnition,
τ0 |
 〈Σ(1), . . . ,Σ(p − 1),Σ(p), . . . ,Σ(N − 1)〉 = Σ . Assume (b) ∃τ ′0 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) such that τ ′0 |
 Σ and τ ′0 ≺ τ0. De-
ﬁne τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) by τ ′ = (τ ′→p−10 .τ ′0(p − 1).τ ′p→0 ); because τ ′0 |
 Σ , we have τ ′ |
 push(Σ, p). From (2) and (b), we get
τ ′ ≺ (τ→p−10 .τ0(p − 1).τ p→0 ). By deﬁnition of τ0, we have τ→p−10 .τ0(p − 1).τ p→0 = τ→p−1.τ (p − 1).τ p+1→ . Using (1),
we get τ ′ ≺ (τ→p−1.τ (p − 1).τ p+1→)  τ , which together with τ ′ |
 push(Σ, p) contradicts (a). Thus, (b) cannot hold,
i.e., ∀τ ′0 |
 Σ , τ ′0 ≺ τ0. Hence, τ0 |
 Ex(Σ) = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉. Moreover, τ0 = 〈τ (1), . . . , τ (p − 1), τ (p + 1), . . . , τ (N)〉, i.e.,
τ |
 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕp−1,ψ,ϕp, . . . , ϕN−1〉.
Still when p  2, we show that 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕp−1,ψ,ϕp, . . . , ϕN−1〉 |
 Ex(push(Σ, p)): we start from a trajectory τ0 ∈
TRAJ(N−1) satisfying 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉 and we claim that τ = (τ→p−10 .τ0(p − 1).τ p→0 ) satisﬁes Ex(push(Σ, p)). Because
τ0 |
 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉, we have τ |
 push(Σ, p). Assume there exists τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) such that τ ′ |
 push(Σ, p) and τ ′ ≺ τ ;
then we deﬁne τ ′0 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) by τ ′0 = (τ ′→p−1.τ ′p+1→). We have τ ′0 |
 Σ . Using (1), we get τ ′→p−1.τ ′(p− 1).τ ′p+1→  τ ′ .
Now, (τ ′→p−1.τ ′p+1→) = τ ′→p−10 .τ ′0(p − 1).τ ′p→0 . Using (2), we get τ ′→p−10 .τ ′0(p − 1).τ ′p→0 ≺ τ→p−10 .τ0(p − 1).τ p→0 , i.e.,
τ ′ ≺ τ0, which contradicts τ0 |
 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕN−1〉 = Ex(Σ), hence τ |
 Ex(push(Σ, p)).0
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and (2) hold, namely (1′) ∀τ ∈ TRAJ(N) , (τ (2).τ 2→) τ , and (2′) ∀τ1, τ2 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) , τ1  τ2 ⇔ (τ1(1).τ 1→1 ) (τ2(1).τ 1→2 ).
(1′) holds because Ch(τ (2).τ 2→) ⊆ Ch(τ ) and  is change-monotonic. (2′) holds because Ch(τ1(1).τ 1→1 ) = Ch(τ1) and also
Ch(τ2(1).τ 1→2 ) = Ch(τ2) and  is change-based. The rest of the proof is similar to the case p  2, using (1′) and (2′) instead
of (1) and (2). 
Proposition 10. The extrapolation operators based on nct , nc , ncl , icl , ncpl , chr and k satisfy (IEO).
Proof. We ﬁrst check that condition (1) of Lemma 3 holds for each of these preference relations. Because all of them
are changed-based and the two trajectories in (1) coincide except at time p, this amounts to check that 〈τ (p − 1), τ (p −
1), τ (p + 1)〉 〈τ (p − 1), τ (p), τ (p + 1)〉. This is easy to check for nct , nc , ncl , icl , ncpl , chr and k . Condition (2)
holds because the change set of the trajectory in the right side of (2) is the same as the change set of the trajectory in the
left side, except that after p − 1, the changes are shifted by one time unit. 
A speciﬁc proof has to be done for Exict , Exncpt , Excseq and Excsi , because they do not satisfy condition (1) of Lemma 3.
For sake of brevity, we only give the proof for Excsi (the proofs for the other operators would be similar).
Lemma 4. Let Σ be a scenario of length N − 1 and τ ∈ TRAJ(N) .
• for any p ∈ 2,N, if τ |
 Excsi(push(Σ, p)) then (τ→p−1.τ (p − 1).τ p+1→) |
 Excsi(push(Σ, p));
• if τ |
 Excsi(push(Σ,1)) then (τ (2).τ 2→) |
 Excsi(push(Σ,1)).
Proof. The second point is straightforward from the fact that Ch(τ (2).τ 2→) ⊆ Ch(τ ).
As for the ﬁrst point, let p ∈ 2,N, and let τ |
 Excsi(push(Σ, p)). Let τp = (τ→p−1.τ (p − 1).τ p+1→), and assume there
is a τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) such that τ ′ |
 push(Σ, p) and τ ′ ≺csi τp . τ ′ ≺csi τp is equivalent to Ch(τ ′) ⊂ Ch(τp), which implies that
τ ′(p) = τ ′(p − 1). Let us deﬁne the trajectory τ ′′ based on τ ′ and τ as follows: ∀t = p, τ ′′(p) = τ ′(p) and for any literal
l ∈ LIT , if 〈l, p + 1〉 ∈ Ch(τ ′), we set τ ′′(p)(l) = τ (p)(l) else we set τ ′′(p)(l) = τ ′′(p − 1)(l).
It is easy to check that τ ′′ |
 push(Σ, p). Moreover, by construction, for any time point different from p and p + 1,
Ch(τ ′′, t) ⊆ Ch(τ , t). Furthermore, since we assumed that τ ′ ≺csi τp , any literal l that changes between p and p + 1 in τ ′
also changes between p and p + 1 in τp . Since τp(p − 1) = τ (p − 1) and τp(p) = τ (p − 1) and τp(p + 1) = τ (p + 1),
we get that this literal changes between time points p − 1 and p + 1 in τ , i.e., τ (p − 1) |
 ¬l and τ (p + 1) |
 l. Hence,
either τ (p) |
 l, and in this case, by construction of τ ′′ we get 〈l, p〉 ∈ Ch(τ ′′) (and 〈l, p + 1〉 ∈ Ch(τ ′′)) and 〈l, p〉 ∈ Ch(τ );
or τ (p) |
 ¬l, and in that case, by construction of τ ′′ we get 〈l, p + 1〉 ∈ Ch(τ ′′) and 〈l, p + 1〉 ∈ Ch(τ ). This is true for any
literal changing in τ ′ . The deﬁnition of τ ′′ implies that any change 〈l, t〉 belonging to Ch(τ ′′) also belongs to Ch(τ ′), except
for t = p + 1, for which the change may either occur at time point p or at p + 1 accordingly to the changes in τ . Hence
any change in τ ′′ belongs to τ . Now, the strict inclusion comes from the fact that Ch(τ ′) ⊂ Ch(τp), since we do not add
any change to τ ′ by deﬁning τ ′′ but we may only change the time point when it occurs, which means that Ch(τ ′′) ⊂ Ch(τ ).
Hence, the assumption that there exists a trajectory τ ′ satisfying push(Σ, p) such that τ ′ csi τp cannot hold. Therefore,
τp |
 Excsi(push(Σ, p)). 
Proposition 11. Excsi satisﬁes (IEO).
Proof. For p  2, the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. As for the case p = 1, the proof it very similar to the proof for
the case p  2 but based on (1′) and (2′) given in the proof of Lemma 3, which both hold because csi is change-monotonic.
Let τ be a csi-preferred trajectory satisfying push(Σ, p). Deﬁne τ0 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) by τ0 = (τ→p−1.τ p+1→); then we have
τ0 |
 Σ . Assume now that there exists a trajectory τ ′0 such that τ ′0 ≺csi τ0 and τ ′0 |
 Σ . Since csi satisﬁes condition (2) of
Lemma 3, we have τ ′0 ≺csi τ0 ⇔ (τ ′→p−10 .τ ′0(p − 1).τ ′p→0 ) ≺csi (τ→p−10 .τ0(p − 1).τ p→0 ). However, this contradicts Lemma 4,
therefore, we get that τ0 |
 Ex(Σ), i.e., τ |
 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕp−1,ψ, . . . ,ϕN−1〉.
For the converse direction, we start from a trajectory τ0 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) such that τ0 |
 Ex(Σ), and then we deﬁne τ ∈ TRAJ(N)
by τ = (τ→p−10 .τ0(p − 1).τ p→0 ); we have τ |
 push(Σ, p). Assume there exists τ ′ ∈ TRAJ(N) such that τ ′ |
 push(Σ, p) and
τ ′ ≺csi τ , then we deﬁne τ ′0 ∈ TRAJ(N−1) by τ ′0 = (τ ′→p−1.τ ′p+1→). We have τ ′0 |
 Σ . Moreover, we have τ = τ→p−10 .τ0(p −
1).τ p→0 , i.e., τ (p − 1) = τ (p) = τ0(p − 1). Now, if τ (p − 1) = τ (p), the same holds for τ ′ , i.e., τ ′(p − 1) = τ ′(p) = τ ′0(p −
1). Due to the fact that csi satisﬁes condition (2) of Lemma 3, this implies that τ ′0 ≺ τ0 which contradicts τ0 |
 Ex(Σ).
Therefore, we get that τ |
 Ex(push(Σ, p)). 
We end this section by giving an example of extrapolation operator that does not satisfy IEO. Deﬁne  on TRAJ(N) by τ 
τ ′ if and only if Ch(τ ,2) Ch(τ ′,2). Then Ex does not satisfy IEO: take Σ = 〈p∨q,¬p∨¬q〉, then Ex(Σ) = 〈p⊕q, p⊕q〉
whereas Ex(push(Σ,1)) = Ex(〈, p ∨ q,¬p ∨¬q〉) = 〈p ∨ q, p ∨ q,¬p ∨¬q〉.
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6.1. Complexity
We start by identifying the complexity of belief extrapolation for some of the most representative preference relations
deﬁned in Section 3. We assume that the reader is familiar with the complexity classes p2 , Θ
p
2 , Π
p
2 of the polynomial
hierarchy. (Since this is not crucial for the rest of the paper, we do not give any details. The reader can refer to, e.g., [26].)
For each preference relation x , we consider the following two decision problems:
• extrax: given two temporal formulae Φ,Ψ , decide whether Ex(Φ) |
 Ψ ;
• extra-scx: given two scenarios Σ and Σ ′ , decide whether Exx(Σ) |
 Σ ′ .
Proposition 12.
1. extrax and extra-scx are Π
p
2 -complete for every x ∈ {csi, icl, cseq, chr};
2. extrak and extra-sck are in P2 , and are 
P
2 -complete for some function k;
3. extranc and extra-scnc are P2 (O (logn))-complete.
Point 2 has to be drawn together with the complexity of inference under the backwards semantics in [23] – see Sec-
tion 8.5.
Lemma 5. For any preference relation  and any two scenarios Σ and Σ ′ , we have Ex(Σ) |
 Σ ′ if and only if E(Σ) |
 Σ ′ .
Proof. From left to right: E(Σ) |
 Ex(Σ) (see point 1 of Observation 4), from which the implication follows. From right to
left: if E(Σ) |
 Σ ′ then S(E(Σ)) |
 S(Σ ′) (S is monotonic with respect to logical consequence, see Observation 2), that is,
Ex(Σ) |
 Σ ′ . 
Therefore, the identity function is a polynomial reduction from extra-scx to extrax , from which we have:
Corollary 12.1. For any x, extrax is at least as diﬃcult as extra-scx.
Therefore, we structure the proof as follows: for each x , we show that extrax belongs to some complexity class C, and
then that extra-scx is C-hard; this allows us to conclude that both extrax and extra-scx are C-complete.
Lemma 6. extracsi , extraicl , extracseq and extrachr are in Π
p
2 .
Proof. Consider the following nondeterministic algorithm:
1. guess a trajectory τ = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉;
2. check that τ |
 Φ;
3. check that there is no τ ′ such that τ ′ |
 Σ and τ ′ ≺ τ ;
4. check that τ |
 ¬Ψ .
This algorithm checks that E(Φ) |
 Ψ . Steps 2 and 4 are done in polynomial time. Step 3 consists of a NP-oracle, since
the problem of checking that there is no τ ′ such that τ ′ |
 Φ and τ ′ ≺ τ is in coNP as soon as τ ′ ≺ τ can be checked
in polynomial time, which is the case for all preference relations considered here. Therefore, the algorithm works in non-
deterministic polynomial time with NP oracles, hence the membership to Σ p2 of the complementary problems of extracsi ,
extraicl , extracseq and extrachr . These problems are therefore all in Π
p
2 . 
Lemma 7. extrak is in P2 .
Proof. Given Φ and an integer Q , the problem (P) of checking whether there exists a trajectory τ |
 Φ such that k(τ ) Q
is in NP, since k(τ ) is computed in polynomial time. Let M =∑v∈V max(k(v),k(¬v)). Let K ∗(Φ) = min{k(τ ) | τ |
 Φ}.
Clearly, 0 K ∗(Φ) (N − 1).M , therefore, K ∗(Φ) can be computed using (P) by dichotomy, and the number of calls to (P)
in the dichotomous algorithm bounded by "log(N.M)#. Now, N.M is at most exponentially large with respect to the size of
the input (where we assume that numbers are, as usual, represented with the binary notation); therefore, the number of
calls to (P) is polynomial. Now, consider the following algorithm:
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2. guess τ ;
3. check that k(τ ) = K ∗;
4. check that τ |
 Φ;
5. check that τ |
 ¬Ψ .
This algorithm checks that Ekcp(Φ) |
 Ψ and works in polynomial time with a polynomial number of calls to NP oracles;
hence the membership of the complementary problem of extrak to P2 , which shows membership of extrak to 
P
2 (=
coP2 ). 
Lemma 8. extra-sccsi is Π
p
2 -hard.
Proof. We exhibit a polynomial reduction from the Π p2 -complete problem simple base revision [25]. The latter is deﬁned
as follows: given a ﬁnite set  = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕp} of propositional formulae, and two propositional formulae α and β , let
MaxCons(,α) be the set of all maximal α-consistent subsets of  (that is, S ∈ MaxCons(,α) if and only if S ∪ {α} is
consistent and there is no S ′ ⊆  such that S ′ ⊃ S and S ′ ∪ {α} is consistent). Then 〈,α,β〉 is a positive instance of simple
base revision if and only if for each S ∈ MaxCons(,α) we have S ∪ {α} |
 β .
Let us now exhibit the polynomial reduction F from simple base revision to extracsi : any instance 〈,α,β〉 of simple base
revision is mapped to the instance of extracsi deﬁned by
• N = 2;
• Var(Σ) = Var() ∪ Var(α) ∪ Var(β) ∪ {x1, . . . , xp}, where Var(ϕ) is the set of variables appearing in the formula ϕ and
x1, . . . , xp are new variables (not appearing in , α and β);
• Σ(1) = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xp ;
• Σ(2) = α ∧ (ϕ1 ↔ x1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ϕp ↔ xp);
• Σ ′ = 〈, β〉.
We now prove that Excsi(Σ)(2) |
 β if and only if 〈,α,β〉 is a positive instance of simple base revision.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xp} and Y = Var() ∪ Var(α) ∪ Var(β). We say that a trajectory τ is Y -static if for any variable y ∈
Var() ∪ Var(α) ∪ Var(β) \ {y}, we have τ (1)(y) = τ (2)(y).
Let τ ∈ Min(csi,Traj(Σ)). We ﬁrst show that τ is Y -static. Suppose it is not the case, i.e., there is an y ∈ Y such that
τ (1)(y) and τ (2)(y) differ. We then build the following trajectory τ ′ from τ as follows:
• τ ′(2) = τ (2);
• for each x ∈ X ∪ Y , τ ′(1)(x) = τ (1)(x);
• τ ′(1)(y) = τ (2)(y).
We have τ ′ |
 Σ : indeed, τ ′(2) = τ (2) and τ |
 Σ imply τ ′(2) |
 Σ , and since y does not appear in Σ(1), the truth value
of y in τ (1) has no inﬂuence on the satisfaction of Σ(1), hence, τ (1) |
 Σ(1) implies τ ′(1) |
 Σ(1). Now, Ch(τ ′) is strictly
contained in Ch(τ ), since it contains the changes of τ except the change regarding y. This contradicts τ ∈Min(csi,Traj(Σ)).
Therefore, any τ ∈Min(csi,Traj(Σ)) is such that τ (1)(y) = τ (2)(y) for any y ∈ Y .
Now, there is a one-to-one correspondence between Y -static trajectories in Traj(Σ) and α-consistent subsets of . Let
τ ∈ Traj(Σ) and let SB(τ ) = {ϕi | τ (2) |
 xi} = {ϕi | 〈xi,2〉 /∈ Ch(τ )}. If τ is Y -static then SB(τ ) is α-consistent, because
τ (1) |
∧i|ϕi∈SB(τ )(xi ∧ϕi)∧α, therefore τ (1) |
 SB(τ ). Conversely, if B is a α-consistent subset of  then let m |
 B ∧α and
build the trajectory τB as follows: τB(1)(v) =m(v),∀v ∈ Y and τB(1)(v) = true ∀v ∈ {x1, . . . xp} and τB(2)(v) =m(v),∀v ∈ Y
and τB(2)(xi) = true iff m |
 ϕi . τB(1) and τB(2) coincide on all variables of Y , therefore τB is Y -static. Moreover, we have
τB(1) |
 Σ(1), and τB(2) |
 Σ(2) (the latter holds because τB(2) |
 α as a consequence of m |
 α), and because τB(2) |
 ϕi
if and only if τB(2) |
 xi (by construction of τ ). Therefore, τB |
 Σ .
Now, τ ∈ Min(csi,Traj(Σ)) implies that {xi | τ (1) |
 ¬xi} is minimal, that is, there is no τ ′ ∈ Min(csi,Traj(Σ)) such
that {xi | τ ′(1) |
 ¬xi} ⊂ {xi | τ (1) |
 ¬xi}. We now have the following chain of equivalences:{
xi | τ (2) |
 ¬xi
}
is minimal
⇔ {xi | τ (2) |
 ¬ϕi} is minimal
⇔ {xi | τ (2) |
 ϕi} is maximal
⇔ τ (2) satisﬁes a maximal α-consistent subset of .
Lastly, we have τ (2) |
 α. Therefore, we have   α |
 β if and only if Excsi(Σ)(2) |
 β . 
Lemma 9. extra-sck is P-hard for some penalty function k.2
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Lemma 8: the scenarios Σ and Σ ′ are deﬁned exactly in the same way, only the criterion for maximality changes. Consider
the penalty-based extrapolation operator deﬁned by the weights k(xi) = 2n−i+1 for every i = 1, . . . ,n. Let , α and β be
deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma 8. The linear base revision of  by α is deﬁned by  L α = Cn(′ ∪ {α}), where ′ is
deﬁned inductively as follows:
• ′0 = ∅;• for all i = 1, . . . , p, ′i = ′i−1 ∪ {ϕi} if ′i−1 ∪ {ϕi} ∪ {α} is satisﬁable, and ′i = ′i−1 otherwise;• ′ = ′n .
Let Σ and Σ ′ be deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma 8, as well as the correspondence between Y -static trajectories and
α-consistent subsets of . Using the very same line of argumentation as in Lemma 8, τ is a Y -trajectory minimizing k(τ )
if and only if τ (2) |
 ′ , from which we get  L α |
 β if and only if Exk(Σ)(2) |
 β . 
Lemma 10. extranc is in P2 (O (logn)).
Proof. The proof is essentially similar to the membership proof of extrak to P2 , except that since trajectory costs are the
number of changes, the number of possible trajectory costs is polynomial (namely, in o(N.|V |)) and the computation of
K ∗(Σ) therefore only requires a logarithmic number (in the size of the input) of calls to (P). 
Lemma 11. extra-scnc is P2 (O (logn))-hard.
Proof. By reduction from cardinality-maximizing base revision [25]. Let , α and β be deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma
8. The cardinality-maximizing base revision of  by α is deﬁned by  C α =⋂{Cn(′ ∪ {α}),′ ∈ MaxCard(B,α)}, where
MaxCard(,α) is the set of all subsets of B of maximal cardinality that are consistent with α.
Again, the proof uses the same reduction as in the proof of Lemma 8. Let Σ and Σ ′ be deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma
8, as well as the correspondence between Y -static trajectories and α-consistent subsets of . We easily check that the
number of changes in τ is equal to p − |Bτ |, therefore, nc-preferred trajectories of τ correspond to α-consistent subsets
of B of maximum cardinality, from which we get  C α |
 β if and only if Exnc(Σ)(2) |
 β . 
Lemma 12. extra-scicl , extra-sccseq and extra-scchr are Π
p
2 -hard.
Proof. This is a straightforward corollary of Lemma 8, once noticed that when N = 2, the preference relations icl , cseq
and chr all coincide with csi . 
Proposition 12 follows from the previous lemmas and Corollary 12.1.
6.2. Computing extrapolated beliefs
In this section, we focus on the practical computation of extrapolated beliefs. A bad news is that techniques for comput-
ing extrapolation are generally sensitive to the choice of the preference relation, which means that, to a large extent, the
study has to be done independently for each preference relation. Considering all preference relations introduced in Section 2
would be far too long. Rather, we focus on the “prototypical” preference relation csi , and on scenario–scenario extrapola-
tion. At the end of the section we brieﬂy say to what extent our results can be generalized to other preference relations, or
to formula–formula extrapolation.
Accordingly, for the rest of this section, we ﬁx the preference relation to csi and we show that the computation of the
preferred trajectories of a given scenario Σ w.r.t. csi (corresponding to the set of what we call minimal explanations for this
scenario) can be done in four steps:
1. for each variable, compute its relevant time points for Σ ;
2. generate the persistence formulae (of the form v(t) ↔ v(t′)) associated to each variable w.r.t. its relevant time points
(computed at step 1);
3. select the maximal subsets of persistence formulae consistent with Σ ;
4. compute the minimal change sets corresponding to the maximal persistence sets (obtained at step 3).
Deﬁnition 14.
• A change set γ = {〈l1, t1〉, . . . , 〈lk, tk〉, li ∈ LIT, ti ∈ 2,N} explains a scenario Σ if there exists a τ ∈ Traj(Σ) such that
Ch(τ ) = γ .
• A minimal explanation γ for Σ is the change set Ch(τ ) of a csi-preferred trajectory τ of Σ .
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corresponds to the change set of a preferred trajectory of Σ , and therefore “explains” the scenario Σ .
Given a scenario Σ (of length N), the number of minimal explanations can be very large, even when the number of
changes is small:
Example 8. Σ0 = 〈a∧ b∧ c ∧ d, , ¬b, d, ¬a, , b, ¬c ∨¬d〉 has 352 minimal explanations (and as many minimal trajecto-
ries). Now, these 352 minimal explanations can be expressed compactly: γ is a minimal explanation for Σ0 if and only if it
contains exactly the following changes:
(i) 〈¬a, t〉 for exactly one t ∈ {2..5};
(ii) 〈¬b, t〉 for exactly one t ∈ {2,3};
(iii) 〈b, t〉 for exactly one t ∈ {4..7};
(iv) either (iv’) 〈¬c, t〉 for one t ∈ {2..8} or (iv′) 〈¬d, t〉 for one t ∈ {5..8}.
Thus we get a total of 4× 2× 4× (7+ 4) = 352 minimal explanations.
To capture this we introduce the notion of compact change sets, which allow for representing succinctly a set of change
“contiguous” sets.
Deﬁnition 15 (Compact change sets).
• A compact change set Γ is a set {〈li, t−i , t+i 〉 | i = 1..p} where each li is a literal and each (t−i , t+i ) is a pair of time points
such that 0< t−i  t
+
i  N .
• A change set γ is covered by a compact change set Γ = {〈li, t−i , t+i 〉 | i = 1..p} if γ = {〈l′1, t1〉, . . . , 〈l′p, tp〉}, and there is a
bijection mapping each 〈l′i, ti〉 ∈ γ to a unique 〈li, t−i , t+i 〉 ∈ Γ such that l′i = li and t−i  ti  t+i . Cov(Γ ) denotes the set
of all change sets covered by Γ .
Let Γ be a compact change set and Σ a scenario. We say that
• Γ explains Σ if and only if every γ ∈ Cov(Γ ) explains Σ ,
• Γ explains minimally Σ if and only if ∀γ ∈ Cov(Γ ), γ is a minimal explanation for Σ .
Intuitively, a compact change set consists of the disjunction of all the change sets it covers.
Example 8 (Continued). Γ = {〈¬a,2,5〉, 〈¬b,2,3〉, 〈b,4,7〉, 〈¬c,2,8〉} explains Σ0 = 〈a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d, , ¬b, d, ¬a, , b,
¬c ∨ ¬d〉. It is a compact change set covered by 4 × 2 × 4 × 7 = 224 minimal explanations such as, for instance,
{〈¬a,2〉, 〈¬b,2〉, 〈¬c,2〉, 〈b,5〉}.
We now deﬁne the notion of maximally covering minimal explanation (mcme). The set of mcmes for Σ expresses minimal
explanations in a compact, redundancy-free way.
Deﬁnition 16. Γ is a maximally covering minimal explanation (mcme) for Σ if and only if (i) Γ explains minimally Σ and (ii)
there is no Γ ′ explaining minimally Σ such that Cov(Γ ) ⊂ Cov(Γ ′).
Example 8 (Continued). Γ is a mcme for Σ0. Let Γ ′ = {〈¬a,2,5〉, 〈¬b,2,3〉, 〈¬c,4,6〉, 〈b,4,7〉}. Γ ′ minimally explains Σ0
as well, but it is not maximally covering, because Cov(Γ ) ⊂ Cov(Γ ′).
The fact that the set of mcmes for Σ is redundancy-free is expressed by the following result.
Proposition 13. For each minimal explanation γ for Σ there exists a mcme Γ for Σ covering γ .
Proof. From Deﬁnition 16, (a) if Γ explains minimally Σ and is not a mcme for Σ then there exists Γ ′ explaining minimally
Σ such that Cov(Γ ) ⊂ Cov(Γ ′).
Let Γ explaining minimally Σ . If Γ is not a mcme for Σ then we apply (a) repeatedly and build a ﬁnite sequence
Γ0 = Γ,Γ1, . . . ,Γp such that for each i  1, Γi explains minimally Σ and Cov(Γi−1) ⊂ Cov(Γi), and we stop until it is
not possible to ﬁnd any Γp+1 such that Cov(Γp) ⊂ Cov(Γp+1). Since the number of change sets is ﬁnite, this process is
guaranteed to stop, and the last Γp obtained is a mcme. Therefore, (b) if Γ explains minimally Σ then there exists a
Γ ′ ∈MCME(Σ) such that Cov(Γ ) ⊆ Cov(Γ ′).
Let γ be a minimal explanation for Σ . Applying (b) to Γ = {〈li, ti, ti〉 | 〈li, ti〉 ∈ γ } enables us to show the existence of a
mcme Γ ′ for Σ covering γ . 
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{〈¬a,2,5〉, 〈¬b,2,3〉, 〈b,4,7〉, 〈¬d,5,8〉}.
When observations are disjunction-free, we only have one maximally compact minimal explanation:
Proposition 14. If for each t, Σ(t) is a conjunction of literals, then there is only one maximally compact minimal explanation for Σ .
Proof. Let Σ = 〈Σ1, . . . ,ΣN 〉 where each Σ i is a consistent conjunction of literals of LIT . For any literal l, let Int(l) be the
set of intervals deﬁned by: θ = [t−, t+] ∈ Int(l) if and only if
• Σ t− |
 ¬l;
• Σ t+ |
 l;
• for all t such that t− < t < t+ , neither l nor ¬l is a conjunct of Σ t .
Now, let Γ = {〈l, θ〉 | l ∈ LIT, θ ∈ Int(l)}. Clearly enough, Γ is a mcme for Σ . Since any minimal explanation γ is covered by
Γ , there is no other mcme for Σ . 
Compact minimal explanations can be computed by adding to Σ a maximal set of persistence formulae expressing that
the value of a variable v persists between two consecutive time points. Now, this would generate as much as (N − 1).p
persistence formulae, where p is the number of propositional variables. Rather than considering all persistence formulae, it
suﬃces to consider, for each propositional variable v , formulae expressing that v persists between two consecutive obser-
vations that are “relevant” to v . This notion of relevance can be expressed in this simple way (see [21]):
Deﬁnition 17.
• A formula ϕ depends on a variable v if and only if every formula equivalent to ϕ contains an occurrence of v . DepVar(ϕ)
denotes the set of all variables on which ϕ depends.9
• For each variable v , deﬁne its set of
relevant time points with respect to Σ , denoted by RΣ(v), as the set of all time points t ∈ 1,N such that v ∈
DepVar(Σ(t)) and
relevant intervals RIΣ(v) to v with respect to Σ as the set of all intervals [t, t′] such that t, t′ ∈ RΣ(v), t = t′ , and
[t + 1, t′ − 1] ∩ RΣ(v) = ∅.
Thus, t is a relevant time point to v if Σ(t) says something about v , and the intuitive meaning of relevant intervals
is that it is sound to consider only persistence assumptions regarding a given variable within these intervals only.10 The
persistence set PΣ is the collection of all such persistence formulae.
Let us illustrate this deﬁnition by an example.
Example 9. Let V = {a,b, c,d}, N = 5 and Σ1 = 〈¬a,a∨ c,b ∧ d,¬a∨¬b,¬c〉.
RΣ1 (a) = {1,2,4}, RΣ1 (b) = {3,4}, RΣ1 (c) = {2,5} and RΣ1 (d) = {3};
RIΣ1 (a) = {[1,2], [2,4]}, RIΣ1 (b) = {[3,4]}, RIΣ1 (c) = {[2,5]}, RIΣ1 (d) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 18. Let Σ be a consistent scenario. We deﬁne:
• ΦΣ =∧Nt=1 Σ(t)(t) the temporal formula associated to the scenario Σ ;• PΣ =⋃{v(t) ↔ v(t′) | v ∈V , [t, t′] ∈ RIΣ(v)} is the persistence set associated with Σ .
• π is a maximal consistent persistence set for Σ if and only if it is a maximal subset of PΣ consistent with ΦΣ ;
• the compact change set Γ (π) associated with π ⊆ PΣ is deﬁned by:
Γ (π) =
⎧⎨
⎩
〈
l, t− + 1, t+〉
v(t−) ↔ v(t+) ∈ PΣ \π and
l =
{
v if π ∪ {ΦΣ } |
 v(t+)
¬v else
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Example 9 (Continued). Again considering Σ1 = 〈¬a,a∨ c,b ∧ d,¬a∨¬b,¬c〉, these deﬁnitions give:
9 Equivalently, v ∈ DepVar(ϕ) does not depend on v if and only if ϕv← , ϕv←⊥ and ϕ are logically equivalent [21]. For instance, DepVar((a∨¬a)∧¬b) =
{b}.
10 This method could be further improved by distinguishing between positive and negative dependence [21].
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PΣ1 = {a(1) ↔ a(2),a(2) ↔ a(4),b(3) ↔ b(4), c(2) ↔ c(5)}.
There are 3 maximal consistent persistence sets for Σ1:
π1 = {a(2) ↔ a(4), c(2) ↔ c(5)};
π2 = {b(3) ↔ b(4), c(2) ↔ c(5)};
π3 = {a(1) ↔ a(2),a(2) ↔ a(4),b(3) ↔ b(4)}.
Γ (π1) = Γ 1 = {〈a,2,2〉, 〈b,4,4〉}; Γ (π2) = Γ 2 = {〈a,2,2〉, 〈¬a,3,4〉}; Γ (π3) = Γ 3 = {〈¬c,3,5〉}. Their minimal change
sets are {〈a,2〉, 〈b,4〉} covered by Γ 1; {〈a,2〉, 〈¬a,3〉} and {〈a,2〉, 〈¬a,4〉} both covered by Γ 2; {〈¬c,3〉}, {〈¬c,4〉} and
{〈¬c,5〉} covered by Γ 3.
Example 8 (Continued). Concerning Σ0, we obtain the following results: PΣ0 = {a(1) ↔ a(5),b(1) ↔ b(3),b(3) ↔ b(7), c(1) ↔
c(8),d(1) ↔ d(4),d(4) ↔ d(8)}. There are two maximal consistent persistence sets for Σ0: {c(1) ↔ c(8),d(1) ↔ d(4)} and {d(1) ↔
d(4),d(4) ↔ d(8)}. Their compact change sets are the two MCME given before, namely, {〈¬a,2,5〉, 〈¬b,2,3〉, 〈b,4,7〉, 〈¬c,2,8〉}
and {〈¬a,2,5〉, 〈¬b,2,3〉, 〈b,4,7〉, 〈¬d,5,8〉}.
We now have the following result:
Proposition 15. γ is a minimal explanation for Σ if and only if there exists a maximal persistence set π for Σ such that γ ∈
Cov(Γ (π)).
Lemma 13. If π is a maximal persistence set for Σ then any change set γ ∈ Cov(Γ (π)) explains minimally Σ .
Proof. Let π be a maximal persistence set for Σ , therefore ΦΣ ∧π is consistent. Let τπ be an interpretation of TRAJN such
that τπ |
 ΦΣ ∧ π . Obviously, τπ |
 ΦΣ is equivalent to τπ |
 Σ . τπ |
 π entails τπ (t−)(v) = τπ (t+)(v) for any v ∈V and
any t+, t− ∈ 1,N such that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) ∈ π .
Let γ be a change set covered by Γ (π). Let us now build τγ as follows: for each variable v ∈V ,
1. for all t ∈ RΣ(v), τγ (t)(v) = τπ (t)(v);
2. for all θ = [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v):
• if τπ (t−)(v) = τπ (t+)(v) then for all t ∈ θ , we let τγ (t)(v) = τπ (t−)(v) (we impose that τγ has no change in this
interval);
• if τ (t−)(v) = τ (t+)(v), which entails v(t−) ↔ v(t+) /∈ π – if τπ (v)(t+) is true (resp. false) then, by deﬁnition, Γ (π)
contains 〈v, t− + 1, t+〉 (resp. 〈¬v, t− + 1, t+〉). By deﬁnition of Cov, there is one and only one t∗ in [t− + 1, t+] such
that 〈¬v, t∗〉 (resp. 〈v, t∗〉) is in γ . Then we let
τγ
(
t−
)
(v) = · · · = τγ
(
t∗ − 1)(v) = τπ (t−)(v) and
τγ
(
t∗
)
(v) = · · · = τγ
(
t+
)
(v) = τπ
(
t+
)
(v);
3. for all t < min(RΣ(v)), we let τγ (t)(v) = τπ (min(RΣ(v))(v);
4. for all t > max(RΣ(v)), we let τγ (t)(v) = τπ (max(RΣ(v))(v).
Because τγ (v) coincides with τπ (v) for every variable v and any time point t ∈ RΣ(v), we have τγ gives the same value as
τπ to the observations ϕ1, . . . , ϕN , therefore τγ |
 Σ . Moreover, by construction Ch(τγ ) = γ .
Let us now assume that τγ is not a preferred trajectory in Traj(Σ) w.r.t. csi : in this case, there exists a τ ′ |
 Σ such
that γ ′ = Ch(τ ′) ⊂ Ch(τγ ) = γ . γ ′ ⊂ γ implies that there is a v ∈ V and a θ ∈ R I(v) such that γ contains either 〈v, t〉 or
〈¬v, t〉 for t ∈ θ and γ ′ contains none. Let θ = [t−, t+] and π ′ = π ∪ {v(t−) ↔ v(t+)}. We have τ ′ |
 ΦΣ (because τ ′ |
 Σ))
and τ ′ |
 π ′ (because γ ′ explains Σ ). Therefore, π ′ is a persistence set of Σ , which contradicts the assumption that π is a
minimal persistence set of Σ . Therefore γ explains minimally Σ . 
Lemma 14. For any change set γ , if γ is a minimal explanation for Σ then there exists a maximal persistence set π for Σ such that
γ ∈ Cov(Γ (π)).
Proof. Let γ = {〈l1, t1〉, . . . , 〈lp, tp〉} be a minimal explanation for Σ . Let us consider the set πγ = {v(t−) ↔ v(t+) ∈ PΣ | ∀t ∈
[t− + 1, t+], 〈v, t〉 and 〈¬v, t〉 are not in γ }. γ being a minimal explanation means that it exists a trajectory τγ ∈min(csi,
Mod(Σ)) such that Ch(τγ ) = γ .
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πγ is not maximal, that is, there exists π ⊃ πγ such that π ∧ ΦΣ is consistent. Let τ |
 π ∧ ΦΣ , then τ |
 Σ . Now, let
change τ into τ ′ the following way:
– for each v ∈V and each t ∈ RΣ(v), τ ′(t)(v) = τ (t)(v);
– for each v ∈V and each [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v) such that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) is in π , τ ′(t)(v) = τ (t−)(v) = τ (t+)(v);
– for each v ∈ V and each [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v) such that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) is not in π , note that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) is not in πγ
either, and therefore there exists a t∗ such that t− < t∗  t+ and 〈v, t∗〉 or 〈¬v, t∗〉 is in γ . Then let
τ ′(t)(v) =
{
τ (t−)(v) if t < t∗,
τ (t+)(v) if t  t∗.
Since τ ′ coincides with τ for each v ∈V and each t ∈ RΣ(v), we have τ ′ |
 Σ . Now, Ch(τ ′) is the subset of γ = Ch(τγ )
consisting of all pairs 〈v, t〉 or 〈¬v, t〉 of γ such that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) is not in π , where [t−, t+] is the interval of RIΣ(v)
such that t− < t  t+; and this inclusion is strict, because π ⊃ πγ . Therefore Ch(τ ′) ⊂ γ , which contradicts the fact that
γ explains minimally Σ .
• Let us show that γ ∈ Cov(Γ (πγ )). Let us consider 〈v0, t0〉 in γ , it means that τγ (t0 − 1) |
 ¬v0 and τγ (t0) |
 v0. We
are going to show that it exists t−, t+ such that t− < t0  t+ and 〈v0, t−, t+〉 ∈ Γ (πγ ).
– If it does not exist t−, t+ such that t− < t0  t+ and [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v0) then either v0 does not appear in Σ or it
appears only at one time point t∗ . Let τ ′ be a trajectory satisfying Σ but in which there is no change for v0 at time
point t0 this trajectory exists: ∀v ∈ V \ {v0},∀t = t0, τ ′(t)(v) = τγ (t)(v) and ∀t, τ ′(t)(v0) = x where x is any truth
value if v0 never appears in Σ or is such that ΦΣ(t∗) |
 x. It means that τγ is not a csi-preferred trajectory for Σ
since Ch(τ ′) = Ch(τγ ) \ {〈v0, t0〉}. Therefore, there exists t−, t+ such that t−< t0  t+ and [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v0), and by
deﬁnition of RIΣ this interval [t−, t+] is unique. Hence by deﬁnition of PΣ and πγ , we have v0(t−) ↔ v0(t+) ∈ PΣ \πγ .
– Now, we have to show that πγ ∪ {ΦΣ } |
 v0(t+) . Suppose that it exists a trajectory τ satisfying πγ ∪ {ΦΣ } ∧ ¬v0(t+) .
Since πγ is a maximal consistent set, it means that τ should satisfy v0(t−) . Let us build a trajectory τ
′ similarly as
above: namely,
∗ for each v ∈V and each t ∈ RΣ(v), τ ′(t)(v) = τ (t)(v);
∗ for each v ∈V and each [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v) such that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) is in πγ , τ ′(t)(v) = τ (t−)(v) = τ (t+)(v);
∗ for each v ∈ V and each [t−, t+] ∈ RIΣ(v) such that v(t−) ↔ v(t+) is not in πγ , there exists a t∗ such that t− <
t∗  t+ and 〈v, t∗〉 or 〈¬v, t∗〉 is in γ . Then let
τ ′(t)(v) =
{
τ (t−)(v) if t < t∗,
τ (t+)(v) if t  t∗.
Since τ ′ coincides with τ for each v ∈V and each t ∈ RΣ(v), we have τ ′ |
 Σ ∧πγ ∧ v0t− ∧ ¬v0t+ . By construction
all the changes in Ch(τ ′) belong to γ . By combining τ ′ and τγ in a new trajectory τ ′′ = τ ′→t∗ .τ t∗+1→γ , we have found
a trajectory that satisﬁes Σ since ∀t, τ ′′(t) |
 Σ(t), and such that Ch(τ ′′) = γ \ {〈v0, t0〉} which contradicts the fact
that τγ was minimal w.r.t. csi . Hence, πγ ∪ {ΦΣ } |
 v0(t+) .
The previous paragraph shows that for all 〈vi, ti〉 ∈ γ it exists one and only one pair of time points (t−, t+) such that
t−< ti  t+ and 〈vi, t−, t+〉 ∈ Γ (πγ ). The same result can be obtain for any 〈¬vi, ti〉 ∈ γ . Hence, γ ∈ Cov(Γ (πγ )). 
Proof of Proposition 15. Corollary of Lemmas 14 and 13. 
Note that it is not always the case that the compact explanations Γ computed according to the previous method are
maximally compact, as seen on the following example: Σ = 〈a, c,a ∨ c,b,¬a ∨ b,¬a〉 yields the compact minimal explana-
tions {〈¬a,4,5〉} and 〈¬a,6,6〉} which are not maximally compact since their union {〈¬a,4,6〉} is a mcme. Obtaining the
mcmes for Σ would require a compactiﬁcation procedure whose precise description is outside the scope of the paper.
Note that in this section, the preference relation was ﬁxed to csi . However, this method can be adapted in order to ﬁnd
minimal explanations for many other preference relations. For instance, nc would need to select consistent persistence sets
of maximum cardinality instead of consistent sets maximum w.r.t. inclusion.
Due to Proposition 15 (and its generalizability to other preference relations), ﬁnding a covering set of compact expla-
nations can be seen as a logic-based abduction problem (where abducibles correspond to elementary changes), and can
be computed using dedicated algorithms. Complexity results and tractable classes [14] can be used to ﬁnd some tractable
subclasses of belief extrapolation.
7. Extrapolation and update
The position of extrapolation with respect to revision is central, and was exposed in Section 4. Here we discuss the
position of extrapolation with respect to belief update, while Section 8 will consider other classes of belief change operators.
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state and a new piece of information ϕ (whose precise meaning is to be discussed further) a new knowledge base K  ϕ
representing the system after this evolution [18,34]. The key property of belief update is Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulate
U8 (K1∨ K2)  ϕ ↔ (K1  ϕ) ∨ (K2  ϕ)
which tells that models of K are updated independently.
7.1. Extrapolation is not update
Since belief update only considers two time points and takes as input a pair (〈K ,α〉) of formulae referring respectively
to t = 1 and t = 2, the comparison with extrapolation is better done in the restricted case where (a) N = 2 and (b) the input
consists in two formulae referring to t = 1 and t = 2, which is exactly the case of scenarios of length 2. To be more precise,
let Σ = 〈Σ(1),Σ(2)〉 be a scenario of length 2. Extrapolating Σ and then projecting the result on time 2 can be rephrased
this way: from a belief set K = Σ(1) at time 1 and an observation α = Σ(2) at time 2, compute a completed belief set at
time 2. At ﬁrst glance, this may look similar to belief update. However, this is not the case. More precisely,
Proposition 16. Assume that the language contains at least two propositional symbols, i.e., |V | 2. Let N = 2 and E be an extrapo-
lation operator. Deﬁne the operator © by: ∀ϕ,ψ ∈L , ϕ © ψ = E(ϕ(1) ∧ ψ(2))↓2 . Then © is not an update operator.
The main reason for this result is that as soon as the language contains at least two propositional symbols, the AGM
postulates are inconsistent with U8 (see for instance [16]). We reformulate the proof for extrapolation as follows:
Proof. Assume that |V |  2, and assume © satisﬁes (U8). Let m1,m2 and m3 be three different interpretations in 2V
(which is possible because |2V |  4). Consider the scenario Σ = 〈form(m1,m2), form(m1,m3)〉 (to simplify notations, we
omit the curly brackets), because PERS ∧ Σ is consistent (in other terms, there is no evidence that a change occurred), by
(E2), we get E(Σ) ≡ PERS∧ Σ = 〈form(m1), form(m1)〉, which by deﬁnition of © entails
(a) form(m1,m2) © form(m1,m3) = form(m1)
Now, © satisﬁes (U8); therefore,
(b) form(m1,m2) © form(m1,m3) ≡ form(m1) © form(m1,m3) ∨ form(m2) © form(m1,m3).
From (a) and (b) we get
(c) form(m1) © form(m1,m3) ∨ form(m2) © form(m1,m3) ≡ form(m1).
Now, by (E3), E(〈form(m2), form(m1,m3)〉) is satisﬁable; thus so is form(m2) © form(m1,m3), which together with (c) im-
plies
(d) form(m2) © form(m1,m3) ≡ form(m1).
Now, by a symmetrical chain of implications, exchanging m1 and m3 in (a)–(d), leads to form(m2) © form(m1,m3) ≡
form(m3), which contradicts (d). Therefore © cannot satisfy (U8). 
This simple result has signiﬁcant consequences. It means that for reasoning about time-stamped observations on a chang-
ing world, belief update is not adequate (see the example in Introduction). The key point is postulate U8 which, by requiring
that all models of the initial belief set be updated separately, forbids us inferring new beliefs about the past from later ob-
servations.
In belief update, the input α should rather be interpreted as the projection of the expected effects of some “explicit
change”, or more precisely, the expected (not the observed) effect of the action (or event) “make α true”. See [20] for further
discussion.
We see that the crucial issues are observability (what do we observe about the world at what time?) and predictability
of change. Belief extrapolation deals with observation and unexpected change, while belief update is suitable for expected
change without observations. In Sandewall’s taxonomy [27], extrapolation is adequate for the action-free subclass of K-IS
(correct knowledge, inertia and surprises) while update is adequate for the class Kp-IA (no observations after the initial
time, inertia and alternative results of actions).
7.2. Non-inertial extrapolation and generalized update
Generalized update [7] consists in ﬁnding out which events (from a given set of events E) most likely occurred between
two time points t1 and t2, and use the knowledge about the dynamics of these events to reason about what was true
at t1 and what is true at t2. The plausibility of events, as well as their dynamics, are modeled by ordinal conditional
functions. In Section 3.2, we describe an event-based extrapolation operator in the same manner as [7]. But in order to
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“The null event ensures (with certainty) that the world does not change” and is such that κ(e∅|m) = 0 if and only if e = e∅ ,
and κ(m′|m, e∅) = ∞ if m = m′ . We slightly modify the second condition into κ(m′ | m, e∅) = 0 if and only if m = m′ in
order to impose that static trajectories are normal. Given an event model E , the plausibility of the transition from m to m′
through e is κE (e,m,m′) = κ(m) + κ(e |m) + κ(m′ |m, e), and the plausibility of the transition from m to m′ is deﬁned as
κE (m,m′) =mine∈E κE (e,m,m′).
If we consider non-inertial extrapolation operator by droping the inertia assumption, then generalized update (w.r.t.
event model E ) is the restriction of non-inertial extrapolation to scenarios with two time points and the preference relation
deﬁned as follows: 〈m1,m2〉E 〈m3,m4〉 if κE (m1,m2) κE (m3,m4). The proof is omitted – it is rather straightforward.
Now, we know that generalized update generalizes both belief revision and belief update, which suggests that non-
inertial belief extrapolation generalizes belief update. This is indeed true to some extent: let  be a KM-update operator,11
ﬁx a propositional formula α, and consider the following event-based model E,α with only one event eα , κ(eα |m) = 0 for
every m, and κ(m′ |m, eα) = 0 if and only if m′ ∈m  α, that is, if and only if m′ ∈ Pref (m,Mod(α)), where {m,m ∈ M}
is the collection of faithful preorderings associated with . eα is an event “simulating” an update by α, and eα being the
only event in the event model implies that this update occurs for sure. Call [,α] the preference relation associated with
this event model. Then Ex[,α](〈ϕ,〉) = 〈ϕ,ϕ α〉. (This holds because for any 2-trajectory τ , κE,α (τ ) = 0 holds if and only
if τ (1) |
 ϕ and τ (2) |
 τ (1)  α.) Therefore, to some extent, update is a particular case of non-inertial extrapolation. This
is not in contradiction with Proposition 16, however, for the following two reasons: (a) inertia (or persistence), needed in
Proposition 16, and (b) the way used for deﬁning the belief extrapolation operator is different: in Proposition 16, we deﬁne
one extrapolation operator, of which ϕ and α are arguments; whereas here we use a family of extrapolation operators –
actually a huge family, since, even when  is ﬁxed, we have a separate operator for each α. Therefore, rather than saying
that non-inertial extrapolation generalizes belief update, we should rather say that for a ﬁxed formula α, there exists a
non-inertial extrapolation operator simulating an update by α.
7.3. Integrating extrapolation and update
Extrapolation and update complete each other and, in order to be able to reason both with implicit and explicit change,
we can integrate both, as suggested in Section 5.2 of [13]. This is developed in [12] and applied to the study of causal
ascription in a scenario. This approach deﬁnes a kind of hypothetical reasoning using both update and extrapolation, which
amounts to compute what could have happened if something had been different in a given story. This operation consists in
updating (in the KM sense) a scenario by a temporal formula: given an initial scenario Σ , it consists in computing, for each
trajectory τ satisfying Σ , the closest trajectories to τ satisfying the new temporal formula Ψ .
Such an integration of unexpected change (via belief extrapolation) and ontic actions (via belief update) has been inves-
tigated in a few other proposals that we describe in Section 8.
8. Related work
Belief extrapolation is not the only class of belief change operators dealing with unexpected change. We review below
a series of approaches, which all have in common that they minimize unexpected change. Some of them are very speciﬁc
operators, some others are more general. Some of them also consider other features such as actions, or consider other ways
of explaining a discrepancy between the agent’s expected beliefs and the actual state of affairs, such as fallible observations,
or wrong initial beliefs about the world.
8.1. Berger, Lehmann and Schlechta
Probably the most related approach to belief extrapolation is the generic class of belief change operators proposed by
Berger et al. [5]. This class of belief change operators is actually a subclass of the set of extrapolation operators (although
the authors use the terminology “iterated updates” – which we think is not adequate, as discussed in Section 7), and is
probably the ﬁrst approach, chronologically speaking, on belief extrapolation. More exactly, an extrapolation operator is a
belief change operator as in [5] if and only if its preference relation satisﬁes the following property (BLS). Let us ﬁrst deﬁne
h(τ ) by h(τ )(1) = τ (1) and for k  1, h(τ )(k + 1) = τ (ik+1) where ik+1 is the smallest integer such that τ (ik+1) = τ (ik) if
it exists, and i1 = 1; and so on until such an integer can no longer be found. Intuitively, the trajectory h(τ ) is a shortcut
for the trajectory τ in which the persistent periods are removed: only the time points where the trajectory has evolved are
kept.
BLS property For any trajectories τ , τ ′ such that there exists a sequence of integers 1 j0 < j1 < · · · < jk such that h(τ ) =
〈m0, . . . ,mn〉 and h(τ ′) = 〈mj0 , . . . ,mjk 〉, we have τ ≺ τ ′ .
11 The argument would hold more generally with any operator satisfying (U8), even if some of the other postulates are not satisﬁed.
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and k . While [5] focus on the axiomatic properties of operators and representation results, they do not study various
preference relations on trajectories nor investigate computational issues.
8.2. Hunter and Delgrande
The framework developed in [17] allows not only for unexpected changes, but also fallible observations, and actions
(without exceptional effects). Their approach is somehow similar to extrapolation, in the sense that it is based on the
selection of preferred trajectories. On the one hand, they go much beyond extrapolation, since the latter does not deal
with ontic action effects, nor fallible observations. On the other hand, they commit to a speciﬁc choice of a preference
relation, that makes use of integer-valued ranking functions that can be seen as associating “surprise degrees” both to
unexpected events and incorrect observations (the reason for using integer-valued degrees is probably that it makes easier
the combination of “surprise degrees” of different kinds). This restriction on preference relations is the main reason for their
Proposition 7, that states that some extrapolation operators are not representable in their framework.12
8.3. Shapiro and Pagnucco
Shapiro and Pagnucco [30] introduce an account of reasoning about action and change in the situation calculus in which
sensing that does not accord with beliefs can be resolved in one of two ways: deciding that a belief about the initial situ-
ation was mistaken, or hypothesizing the occurrence of a sequence of exogenous actions. They hypothesize the occurrence
of exogenous actions only when necessary, and do so through a notion of minimal change. Therefore, the agent will prefer
situations that have less exogenous actions.
Apart from the fact that it also allows ontic actions (and thus updates), this framework is a situation calculus version
of a speciﬁc extrapolation operator (minimizing the number of exogenous events). Our other extrapolation operators could
probably be expressed in the situation calculus as well (we leave this for further research).
8.4. Booth and Nittka
Booth and Nittka [6] take a subjective view of belief revision that could be seen as a subjective version of extrapolation:
given an observer and an observed agent, the observer tries to make inferences about what the agent believed (or will
believe) at a given moment, based on an observation of how the agent has responded to some sequence of previous belief
revision inputs over time. Assuming a framework for iterated belief revision which is based on sequences, they construct a
model of the agent that “best explains” the observation.
As they say, a fundamental difference between that work and extrapolation is that belief extrapolation is, like traditional
operators of revision and update, an agent’s perspective operator: it is concerned with how an agent should form a picture
of how the external world is evolving, whereas they are interested in forming a picture of how an observed agent’s beliefs
are evolving.
The comparison between [6] and extrapolation suggests a promising issue for further research: “subjective extrapolation”
would consist in starting with a scenario describing what we know of the agent’s beliefs at different time points (possibly
using formulae from doxastic logic), and then ﬁnd the most plausible events that occurred and that explain the changes in
the agent’s beliefs.
8.5. Liberatore and Schaerf
Liberatore and Schaerf [23] propose a fairly general system (BReLS) aiming at integrating revision, update and merging. It
deals with time-stamped observations and consider two semantics; using the “trajectory” semantics and assuming that there
is no more than one observation at each time point, we obtain our extrapolation operator induced by the penalty-induced
relation k . The other semantics (“pointwise”) yields iterated update (but is incompatible with extrapolation because of U8
which underlies this semantics). On the other hand, BReLS provides an integrated treatment of both static and dynamic
reasoning, and thus includes the possibility of representing exceptional effects or misperceptions.
8.6. Friedman and Halpern
Friedman and Halpern [15] deﬁne a very general framework for belief change, of which revision and update are two
speciﬁc instances. We give here a simpliﬁed presentation of the framework (and slightly change the terminology), but
rich enough to show how extrapolation ﬁts in it. Let W = 2P S the set of all truth assignments to primitive propositions.
A plausibility measure is a mapping Pl from 2W to an ordered scale D with a top element D and a bottom element ⊥D ,
12 When specializing the framework so that observations are fully reliable and no ontic actions are involved, the class of extrapolation operator obtained
would be a speciﬁc subclass of event-based extrapolation operators.
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pair I = (R,P) where
• R is a set of runs; a run r is a pair 〈τr,Σr〉 where τr is a trajectory and Σr is a scenario. If r is a run and t a time
point we denote re(t) = τr(t) and ra(t) = 〈Σr(1), . . . ,Σr(t)〉. re(t) (resp. ra(t)) is the environment state (resp. the agent’s
local state) at (r, t).
• P is a plausibility assignment mapping each pair (r, t) to a plausibility measure Pl(r,t) on 2W .
A belief change is said to satisfy the prior assumption if at the start of the process, the agent has a prior plausibility
Pla : R → D on the set of runs R from which all Pl(r,t) can be determined. At time point t0 of the run r, the set of runs
considered possible for the agent is the set of all runs such that (a) the observations done so far, i.e. Σ(t) from t = 1 . . . t0,
coincide with those in ra: Σ(t) = Σr(t); (b) the objective part of the run is compatible with the observations done so far,
i.e., for all t = 1 . . . t0, τr(t) |
 Σ(t). Under the key assumption named prior (that we do not recall here), belief change is
made conditioning: at each time point, the agent modiﬁes its current plausibility distribution on runs by conditioning it by
whatever piece of information he has learned. Finally, a formula ϕ is believed by the agent in some point (r, t) if for all
s ∈ W (r,t) such that there is no s′ ∈ W (r,t) with Pl(s′) > Pl(s), then π(s) |
 ϕ .
Belief revision and update are special instances of belief change systems satisfying prior. Now, for all classes of pref-
erence relations studied in this article, scenario extrapolation is also an instance of a belief change system satisfying prior.
The key point consists in identifying plausibility spaces and conditioning for various extrapolation operators. Intuitively, the
prior plausibility at the starting point of the process (at time 0, that is, before the ﬁrst observation is made) reﬂects the
preference relation over trajectories. To make things simpler, we illustrate the correspondence on the case =nc , but we
insist that the process works for a much wider class of extrapolation operators (including all those that are based on any of
the preference relations given in Section 3).
Let D = N, with the reverse natural order, namely i D j iff i  j, and D = 0, ⊥D = +∞. For any run r, deﬁne
pl(r) = |Ch(τr)|: the plausibility of a run is the number of changes of its associated trajectory. Conditioning by observations
is deﬁned by
pl(r | ϕ(t)) =
{+∞ if τ |
 ¬ϕ(t),
pl(τr) −min{pl(τ ′)|τ ′ |
 ϕ(t)} otherwise.
Since pl(r) is fully determined by τr , we use the notation pl(τr) = pl(r) (that is, the plausibility of a trajectory is deﬁned as
the plausibility of any run that corresponds to it). The plausibility of a set X of runs is Pl(X) = min{pl(r)|r ∈ X}: it is thus
determined by the number of changes in the trajectory of the most static run in X . The deﬁnition for Pl(X | ϕ(t)) is similar.
Finally, let run(Σ) = {r | τr |
 Σ}. Now, we have the following:
Ex(Σ) |
 Σ ′ iff for any τ , pl(τ | Σ) = 0 implies τ |
 Σ ′
(the proof of which is omitted).
Example 10. For example, let Σ = 〈a,¬a∧ b,a∨¬b,a∧ b〉. Initially, pl0(τ ) = |Ch(τ )|. After observing a(1) , we get
pl1(τ ) = pl0(τ | a(1)) =
{ |Ch(τ )| if τ (1) |
 a,
+∞ otherwise.
Then, at time 2,
pl2(τ ) = pl1(τ | ¬a(2) ∧ b(2))
= pl0(τ | a(1) ∧¬a(2) ∧ b(2))
=
{ |Ch(τ )| − 1 if τ |
 a(1) ∧¬a(2) ∧ b(2),
+∞ otherwise.
We have pl2(τ ) = 0 if and only if τ (1) = ab and τ (2) = ¬ab. At time 4, the two trajectories such that pl4(τ ) = 0 are
〈ab,¬ab,¬ab,ab〉 and 〈ab,¬ab,ab,ab〉. The trajectories τ such that pl(τ | Σ) = 0 are exactly the trajectories minimizing the
total number of changes, i.e., the preferred trajectories with respect to nc .
Characterizing other speciﬁc extrapolation operators considered in this paper by a conditioning operator can be done in
a very similar way.
8.7. Extrapolation and dynamic diagnosis
Belief extrapolation addresses a problem similar to dynamic diagnosis, where the goal is to identify a complete evolution
of the world which best ﬁts a given (maybe incomplete) history that contains some abnormal behaviours. More precisely,
the general principle of dynamic diagnosis is composed of the following elements:
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several failure modes);
• a set of actions, including test actions (such as measures) and repair actions, and a series of known action occurrences
at different time points;
• a series of observations made at different time points.
We then look for a set of plausible diagnoses, that is, a series of faults together with the time where they occurred, or
for a plan for having the system work again normally. There are various approaches of dynamic diagnosis (see e.g. [8] for
an early survey of deﬁnitions) which vary along with several features, such as the logical language used for modelling the
system, the actions and the observations (e.g., action languages in [32] and [3], logic programs in [2]), the nature of the
available actions, the type of diagnosis (abductive or consistency-based), and the selection principle for ﬁnding plausible
diagnoses. Consistency-based dynamic diagnosis consists in ﬁnding a series of failures across time which is consistent with
the observations and the system description (while an abductive diagnosis together with the system description should
allow to deduce the observations). Therefore, extrapolation can be seen both as a simpliﬁcation and a generalization of
consistency-based dynamic diagnosis: a simpliﬁcation, because extrapolation assumes that the normal behaviour of the
system is inertia and that no action is available to the agent; and a generalization, because extrapolation proposes a richer
set of selection operators (which not only minimize the set or number of changes but also are able to compare sequences
of changes, combinations of changes etc.), while each individual approach to dynamic diagnosis makes use of a speciﬁc
selection criterion. For instance, the criterion in Thielscher [32] is chronological and minimizes abnormalities in the initial
state while taking account of the prior likelihood of failure of the components; Baral et al. [3] minimize the set of faulty
components and exogenous actions and propose a diagnosis-plan that aims at selecting dynamically a diagnosis by giving
the sequence of tests to be done in order to discriminate between the unobserved possible faulty components; this kind of
checking plan is also used by Balduccini and Gelfond [2] who do not use any prior minimization process but ﬁlter out some
of the candidate diagnoses by using some elimination criteria (such as being unrelated to the symptoms, a too large time
interval between faults and symptoms, or a too large number of faults).
Thus, extrapolation offers a much more systematic and principled study of such operators (through an axiomatization
and a representation result), and our results are of course relevant to dynamic diagnosis, especially because extrapolation
contributes to bridging dynamic diagnosis and belief change.
9. Conclusion
We have studied a general family of belief change operators which consist in completing initial observations by persis-
tence assumptions. We have discussed in details the links between extrapolation and revision, and its differences with belief
update. Belief extrapolation amounts to a speciﬁc case of belief revision where beliefs are expressed in a time-stamped lan-
guage, and possesses many speciﬁcities that are proper to this temporal structure. Belief extrapolation can also be seen as a
simpliﬁcation of dynamic diagnosis, and thus contributes to build a bridge between dynamic diagnosis and belief change.
The connection between belief revision and belief extrapolation deserves some ﬁnal comments. As we have seen in
Section 4, every belief extrapolation operator can be expressed as a belief revision operator through time-stamping the
propositional language. Now, knowing that belief extrapolation is, in some sense, less general than belief revision, does not
mean it does not deserve a study of its own, and most of our results concern speciﬁcities of extrapolation that would be
meaningless in a standard, atemporal, belief revision framework. This is the case for the preference relations and extrapo-
lation operators described in Section 3, together with their associated complexity results in Section 6: none of these could
be deﬁned in an atemporal language (to begin with, change sets would be meaningless). Section 5 lays the focus on a few
speciﬁc temporal properties of extrapolation. Finally, the method given in Section 6 also exploits the temporal structure as
much as possible.
We chose to model beliefs across time using explicit time points (thus making use of a propositional logic of reiﬁed
time). Since our results, and the preference relations we have focused on, do not exploit the metric nature of time, they
would still hold in a similar way if we had chosen to use a purely symbolic representation of time such as in modal
logics for belief change (e.g., [29,33]) or epistemic or doxastic extensions of the situation calculus (e.g., [11,28]). In such
frameworks we are still able to express sequences of observations and reason about them. More generally, given that belief
extrapolation is a form of belief revision, all frameworks that have been shown relevant to belief revision are also relevant
to belief extrapolation. Finally, using a modal language would open the door to new opportunities; in particular, having a
speciﬁc belief modality for each time point (or situation) allows to express mutual intertemporal beliefs such as “at time
3 I believed that ϕ held at time 2 while I now believe that ϕ did not hold at time 2”, as in the following example: let
Σ = 〈a ∧ b ∧ c, (¬a ∧¬b) ∨¬c,,¬a,¬b〉. Performing an Exnc extrapolation after only three observations have been made,
we extrapolate that ¬c held at time 2, while extrapolating after all observations gives that c held at 2.
Further work includes developing a full framework for reasoning about both predicted change (action effects) and un-
predicted change, in the same vein as some of the works reported below, but with a much larger degree of generality.
Moreover, in this paper we focused on inertial extrapolation, which considers changes as exceptional (which, technically,
leads to minimizing change). We may consider more general extrapolation operators that deal with non-inertial systems
with a speciﬁc dynamics. Another line of further work consists in generalizing extrapolation to nontemporal classes of sce-
790 F. Dupin de Saint-Cyr, J. Lang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 760–790narios, such as spatial scenarios, where observations are labelled with points in space and persistence by default applies to
adjacent points. See [10] for a preliminary study.
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